USA v. Xavier Alvarez - Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES v. ALVAREZ
11883
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.’ ” Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). The Court has
stated as plain as words permit that “the erroneous statement
of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection.” Id.; see also
BE & K Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002)
(“[F]alse statements [are] unprotected for their own sake.”);
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False
statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere
with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas
. . . .”); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776
(1984) (false statements of fact have “no constitutional value”
because they “harm both the subject of the falsehood and the
readers of the statement” (quotation marks omitted)); Bill
Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983)
(“[F]alse statements are not immunized by the First Amendment
right to freedom of speech.”); Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 171 (1979) (“Spreading false information in and of
itself carries no First Amendment credentials.”). False statements
are unprotected by the First Amendment except in a
limited set of contexts where such protection is necessary “to
protect speech that matters,” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341, such as
“expression critical of the official conduct of public officials,”
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964).
And even in these special contexts, “the knowingly false statement
and the false statement made with reckless disregard of
the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.” Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (emphasis added).
Despite the clarity and consistency of the Supreme Court’s
insistence that false statements of fact (or “false statements”)
generally fall outside First Amendment protection, the majority
somehow manages to “find no authority holding that false
factual speech, as a general category unto itself, is among [the
historically unprotected classes of speech],” Maj. Op. at
11861 (emphasis added), and concludes that “we presumptively
protect . . . false statements,” id. at 11881. The majority