Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'Etre ... - Marcuse.org

EXISTENTIALISM' 319
there is no breaking out of the circle of frustration. On the other hand,
man must "engage" in one of these attitudes because his very:reality consists
in nothing but such "engagement." Thus, after the failure of each
attempt,
"il ne reste plus au pour-soi qu'A rentrer dans Ie cercle et A se laisser indefiiniment
ballotter de l'une A l'autre des deux attitudes fondamentales."26
Here, the image of Sisyphus and his absurd task appears most naturally
as the very symbol of man's existence. Here, too, Sartre deems it appropriate
to add in a footnote that "these considerations do not exclude
the possibility of a morality of liberation and salvation"; however, such a
morality requires a "radical conversion, which we cannot discuss at this
place."
II
The main ontological argument is concluded by this analysis of the
fundamental interhuman relationships; the remaining part of the book is
taken up by a synopsis of the "realite humaine" as it has emerged in the
preceding interpretation. The synopsis is guided by the concept of freedom.
The ontological analysis had started with the identification of Ego
(Cogito) and freedom. The subsequent development of the existential
characteristics of the Ego had shown how his freedom is inextricably tied up
within the contingency of his "situation," and how all attempts to make
himself the free foundation of his existence are eternally condemned to
frustration. The last part of Sartre's book resumes the discussion at this
point in order to justify finally, in the face of these apparent contradictions,
the ontological identification of human being and freedom.
For Sartre, the justification cannot be that which is traditionally featured
in idealistic philosophy, namely, the distinction between transcendental
and empirical freedom., This solution cannot suffice for him because his
analysis of the Ego does not remain 'within the transcendental-ontological
dimension. Ever since his Ego, in the Third Part of his book, had to
acknowledge the existence of the Other as a plain "necessite de fait," his
philosophy had left the realm of pure ontology and moved within the
ontic-empirical world.
Sartre thus cannot claim that his philosophy of freedom is a transcendental-ontological
one and therefore neither committed nor equipped to go
into the (empirical) actuality of human freedom. Quite in contrast to
Heidegger (whose existential analysis claims to remain within the limits of
26 Page 484. "there is no alternative left for the Being-for-itself but to return into
the circle and to be tossed about indefinitely from one to the other of these two fundamental
attitudes."