Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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Paul L. Manata © 2011
How do semi-­‐compatibilists show that ability to do otherwise is not required for
moral responsibility? They have a few ways, one of which is to appeal to what is
known as Frankfurt-­‐style counterexamples, named after philosopher Harry
Frankfurt, to show this. While these counterexamples have generated a
tremendous amount of back-­‐and-­‐forth in the literature, and the debate can get
quite sophisticated, in keeping with our broad overview approach I will offer a
run of the mill example:
Suppose Jones wants to kill the president. Black, an evil neurosurgeon who
dislikes the president, finds out Jones’s plans. Black is happy about this
turn of events but doesn’t want to leave matters to indeterminist chance.
So he drugs Jones and renders him unconscious. While Jones is
unconscious, Black implants a neural monitoring device in Jones’s head
that enables Black to tell what Jones is going to do before he does it. The
device is equipped with an “overrider button” that allows the controller to
override the subject’s control and switches control to something that looks
like a joy stick, allowing the controller to manipulate the subject to do
what he wants him to do. Thus, reasons Black, “If Jones opts to back out at
the last moment, I will press the overrider button and ensure that Jones
goes through with the plan [insert evil laugh and rubbing together of
hands].” When the day arrives, Jones heads down to the designated area
with rifle in hand. Jones sets up and as the president approaches he stays
resolved and carries out the assassination. Black, therefore, never needed
to press the overrider button. Jones killed the president of his own free
will, and certainly appears to be morally responsible for his actions.
However, and here’s the kicker, Jones couldn’t have done otherwise than
he did. For, if he had given any indication that he might do otherwise,
Black would have pressed the overrider button. So, either Jones freely