For The Defense, December 2012 - DRI Today
For The Defense, December 2012 - DRI Today
For The Defense, December 2012 - DRI Today
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Drug anD MeDical Device<br />
Inc., 942 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1991), the<br />
Seventh Circuit found that a physician who<br />
ordered the injection of a drug that allegedly<br />
harmed a plaintiff was not an indispensable<br />
party to a product liability case<br />
against the manufacturer of the drug.<br />
<strong>Defense</strong> counsel should know that not<br />
all jurisdictions look upon claims against<br />
a treating physician or implanting sur-<br />
Procedural rules<br />
governing discovery and<br />
how those rules are applied<br />
also merit consideration<br />
when deciding whether<br />
to pursue removal to<br />
a federal court.<br />
geon for medical negligence as unrelated<br />
to product liability claims against a drug<br />
or medical device manufacturer, and they<br />
have found medical providers to be indispensable<br />
parties or otherwise declined to<br />
sever the claims against them. <strong>For</strong> example,<br />
in Echols v. OMNI Medical Group, Inc.,<br />
751 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216–17 (N.D. Okla.<br />
2010), the district court found that the<br />
prejudice to the plaintiff presented by the<br />
need to prosecute separate cases against a<br />
pharmaceutical manufacturer and a prescribing<br />
physician precluded severing the<br />
product liability claims from the medical<br />
malpractice claims. Similarly, in Selman<br />
v. Pfizer, Inc., 2011 WL 6655354, at<br />
*12 (D. Or. 2011), and Robinson v. Swedish<br />
Health Servs., 2010 WL 816818, at *2 (W.D.<br />
Wash. 2010), the district courts refused to<br />
sever claims against drug prescribers from<br />
claims against the drug manufacturers. In<br />
the holdings, the district court in each case<br />
found that the plaintiff had not misjoined<br />
the claims because they involved common<br />
issues of law and fact.<br />
While drug and medical device litigation<br />
frequently includes unrelated claims<br />
against nondiverse defendants, these claims<br />
also arise in other types of cases. Courts<br />
20 ■ <strong>For</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> ■ <strong>December</strong> <strong>2012</strong><br />
have applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure<br />
in a variety of cases to sever and remand<br />
claims against nondiverse parties to<br />
preserve diversity. In Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds<br />
Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir.<br />
2006), the court severed negligence claims<br />
against medical providers from those<br />
claims against nonmedical product manufacturers<br />
in a wrongful death case. <strong>The</strong><br />
Eleventh Circuit, in Ingram v. CSX Transp.,<br />
Inc., 146 F.3d 858, 862–63 (11th Cir. 1998),<br />
a personal injury case against a railroad<br />
company, exercised the authority set forth<br />
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Newman-<br />
Green to drop a nondiverse, dispensable<br />
defendant municipality under Federal Rule<br />
21 of Civil Procedure to preserve diversity<br />
jurisdiction, postjudgment, on the appeal.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Second Circuit Court severed and dismissed<br />
claims on the appeal in a breach of<br />
contract action in Highland Capital Mgmt.,<br />
LP v. Schneider, 198 F. App’x 41, 45 (2d Cir.<br />
2006), against nondiverse, joint tortfeasors<br />
to maintain diversity. In Archway Ins. Services,<br />
LLC v. Harris, 2011 WL 2415168 (E.D.<br />
Pa. 2011), the district court severed claims<br />
against bank defendants from claims for<br />
fraud against insurance broker defendants<br />
to perfect its diversity jurisdiction. And in<br />
Davis v. Cassidy, 2011 WL 6180054 (E.D. La.<br />
2011), the district court severed personal injury<br />
claims arising from an automobile accident<br />
from claims arising from a separate,<br />
unrelated vehicular accident, finding that<br />
different issues of liability were involved in<br />
each, despite the plaintiff’s claims of aggravation<br />
of injuries.<br />
How to Decide to Remove<br />
or Not to Remove<br />
While the means exist to move a case with<br />
a nondiverse defendant from a state court<br />
into a federal court, an astute defense attorney<br />
must also analyze whether to take advantage<br />
of these tools. In most instances,<br />
the decision to remove is a proverbial “no<br />
brainer.” Most product liability defense<br />
attorneys and company general counsel<br />
would agree that, by and large, a federal<br />
forum is the preferred forum in which to<br />
litigate and try a product liability case. But<br />
in some regions, the state court venue may<br />
be the better choice for any number of reasons.<br />
<strong>For</strong> example, the state court judges in<br />
an area may be perceived as more legally<br />
conservative than their federal counter-<br />
parts. Likewise, the makeup of the potential<br />
jury pool is a factor to consider. Because<br />
a state court judicial district often draws<br />
potential jurors from a single county or a<br />
smaller geographic area than the federal<br />
district in which it is located, a jury in the<br />
state court may be more apt not to find liability,<br />
or to award less in a damages award<br />
than a jury in the federal court. Additionally,<br />
a defendant company’s ties to a community<br />
may make a state court venue more<br />
attractive. When a company is well-known<br />
and well regarded by the members of the<br />
jury pool, they may be less likely to find that<br />
the company engaged in willful and wanton<br />
misconduct or other actions that warrant<br />
imposing punitive or exemplary damages.<br />
Procedural rules governing discovery<br />
and how those rules are applied also merit<br />
consideration when deciding whether to<br />
pursue removal to a federal court. Questions<br />
to ask in this area include: How does<br />
the state court approach discovery? Does<br />
the state court provide a product liability<br />
plaintiff with more or less latitude in the<br />
breadth and scope of permissible discovery?<br />
Does the state court have rules in place<br />
permitting and regulating e- discovery? If<br />
so, how do those rules compare with the<br />
federal e- discovery rules? Are the state<br />
rules as broad and encompassing as the<br />
federal rules? Are the state court judges<br />
more or less likely to impose sanctions<br />
for discovery violations? Are the sanctions<br />
doled out in the state court more or<br />
less severe than those imposed in the federal<br />
court? What is the state’s position on<br />
involving “C-level” executives in the discovery<br />
process in terms of depositions or<br />
other things? Does the state distinguish<br />
between a “discovery deposition” and an<br />
“evidence deposition”? Illinois, for example,<br />
makes this distinction and places limits<br />
on the purposes for which a plaintiff<br />
may use a discovery deposition. Does the<br />
state court impose limits on expert discovery<br />
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure<br />
do not? In Pennsylvania state courts<br />
do not routinely permit discovery depositions<br />
of expert witnesses.<br />
<strong>The</strong> state and federal tribunal also may<br />
conduct trials differently. Most, if not all,<br />
federal courts frequently empanel a jury<br />
trial of less than 12 persons to hear a civil<br />
case. Many states permit a defendant to<br />
Federal Case , continued on page 89