RCAF Radar Personnel in WWII -North Atlantic Region-

North Atlantic Region
RCAF Radar Personnel in WWII North Atlantic Region
Background:
When Germany invaded Denmark and then Norway in April 1940, and rapidly acquired air and sea
bases on the Norwegian coast right up to Cape North, the threat to Allied merchant shipping using
the high latitude routes across the North Atlantic increased significantly; and Scapa Flow, the Royal
Navy’s home base in the Orkney Islands, was within easy range of German long-range aircraft.
Extension of ground radar cover northward and northeastward from Scotland became an urgent
requirement, as witness a directive* issued by Churchill (then First Sea Lord) dated 16 April 1940:
“ . . .you should now assume the duty of concerting action to make the Faroes satisfactory for our
purposes. Pray make a weekly report. DCNS will supply you with the requirements. We must have
an aerodrome and RDF (radar) at the very earliest moment, together with AA defence, and a few
coastal guns. This will be a very tempting base for a raid . . .”
That particular directive dealt only with necessary action on the Faroes, but the need for additional
radar cover based on the Orkneys and Shetlands was also recognized. The Inter-Services RDF
Committee called for immediate placement of three additional CH (Chain Home) radars on these
two island groups, together with complementary CHL (Chain Home Low) radars.
Iceland too was of great concern to Allied planners. It was known that, prior to the outbreak of
WWII, Germany had sent a large commission to Iceland to negotiate for air bases there.
Fortunately, the Icelandic Cabinet had refused to grant any bases; nor would it allow German
airlines to establish ‘commercial routes.’ But with WWII underway, Germany was freed from the
constraint of “tipping its hand prematurely,” and Allied planners had to assume that German
occupation of Iceland was imminent, with dire consequences for Allied trans-Atlantic shipping: the
Allies would be denied potentially valuable bases from which to launch attacks on U-boats; and
German long-range aircraft would be able to reach Allied convoys sailing on routes previously
threatened by only U-boats.
Faced with this dangerous threat, Britain acted within a month of the German move into Denmark,
sending a force of Royal Marines into Iceland to forestall any German invasion, at the same time
pledging to respect Iceland’s independence. A similar treaty between the U.S.A and Iceland, made
public in July 1941, enabled the U.S. to augment, and subsequently relieve British forces for service
elsewhere.
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* Churchill’s Second World War Vol . 1
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