On the Nature of Military Theory - National Defense University

34 TOWARD A THEORY OF SPACEPOWER
27 Ibid., 145.
28 Ibid., 146–147.
29 Carl Becker, “Everyman His Own Historian,” American Historical Review XXXVII (January
1932), 221–236; reprinted in Carl L. Becker, Everyman His Own Historian: Essays on History and Politics
(New York: F.S. Crofts, 1935), 233–255.
30 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (1862;
reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 321.
31 Ibid., 323.
32 Clausewitz, On War, 89. Clausewitz’s description of the three elements provides a strong indication
of his lack of dogmatism: “These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deeprooted
in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any
one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such
an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.”
33 Jomini, 322. The maxims themselves are found on page 70.
34 The derivation of these nine principles is laid out in Fuller, 208–229. Fuller named them
Direction, Concentration, Distribution, Determination, Surprise, Endurance, Mobility, Offensive Action,
and Security. The U.S. Air Force’s current list of principles of war includes Unity of Command,
Objective, Offensive, Mass, Maneuver, Economy of Force, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity. Air Force
Basic Doctrine: AF Doctrine Document 1, November 17, 2003, 19–26, available at .
Contemporary joint doctrine contains precisely the same list of the
principles of war as the Air Force’s but adds three “Other Principles”: Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy.
Joint Publication 3–0, Joint Operations, September 17, 2006, II–2, available at .
35 Jomini, 16–39. The chapter is titled “The Relation of Diplomacy to War.”
36 Clausewitz, On War, 97.
37 Henry M. Wriston, foreword to Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense (1959; reprint,
Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1989), vii.
38 J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (1967; reprint, Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, n.d.), 31.
39 For DePuy’s pivotal role in the formulation of the 1976 edition of FM 100–5 and the reaction
thereto, see Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, Changing an Army: An Oral History of General
William E. DePuy, USA Retired (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Military History Institute, n.d.),
187–189, and John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine
1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), 3–21.
40 Department of the Army, Field Manual 100–5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of
the Army, 1982), 1–1, 1–4, 2–1, and 11–1.
41 Ibid., 2–1, 2–8.
42 Ibid., 7–13 through 7–17.
43 Ibid., 2–3.
44 Department of the Army, Field Manual 100–5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of
the Army, 1986), 10.
45 Clausewitz, On War, 76. This definition, as the drafters of the manual were well aware, was
much more conceptual than Jomini’s description of strategy as “the art of making war upon the map.”
Jomini, Art of War, 69.
46 Interview with Professor Dennis M. Drew, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, March
11, 2004. In addition to an extremely detailed history of U.S. Air Force operations in the Korean War,
Futrell produced a two-volume compilation titled Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the
United States Air Force (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989).
47 Department of the Air Force, Air Force Manual 1–1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United
States Air Force, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1992), 1:v.
48 For a detailed assessment of this groundbreaking work, see Harold R. Winton, “Reflections
on the Air Force’s New Manual,” Military Review 72 (November 1992), 20–31.