Missile Defence, Deterrence and Arms Control - UNIDIR

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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) expectations, possessed a solid fuel
third stage. 3 The test only lent credence to the Rumsfeld Commission’s
conclusion that the DPRK would imminently be capable of targeting
United States territory. In July 2001, the CIA reported that the DPRK had
conducted engine tests for its Taepo-Dong 2 missile, which would be
capable of targeting mainland the United States. It is this emerging threat,
along with the activities of other potentially hostile nations—reconfirmed
by the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate Report—that the United
States cites as the primary warrant for a ballistic missile defence.
Cited as less likely threats are accidental or unauthorized launches
by existing or future ballistic missile States. The probability of such a
strike is low, especially given efforts to stabilize and upgrade command
and control infrastructure in States where this may be likely—for
example the Russian Federation. The Cooperative Threat Reduction
programme, has done much to alleviate concerns that the Russian
Federation’s nuclear and ICBM arsenal is unsafe. Still, the potential for
accidental or unauthorized launches clearly exists and is used as a further
justification for building missile defences to protect the United States and
its forces. Needless to say, a missile defence system provides no
protection against sub-State or State-sponsored terrorists who can
infiltrate the United States of America’s porous borders with relative ease
and covertly detonate a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)—a threat
that some consider much greater than a limited ballistic missile attack.
3
The test was ostensibly aimed at placing a satellite, mounted on the third
stage, into orbit. It failed when the third stage failed to release properly.