Hacking Exposed

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Attacks and Headlines Threats: Opportunity Meets Motivation Meets Ability… PDA, cell phone, wireless Bots, Botnets DDOS networks User-propagated viruses, Trojans, PW stealers Targeted attacks MISUSED FUNCTIONALITY MALICIOUS INTENT USERS’ POOR COMMON SENSE Social Engineering, Privacy Breaches, Collusion DESIGN FLAWS Spam, mass-mailers, phishing, pharming Vulnerabilities, Exploits, Scripted attacks Spyware, Adware, PUPs
Evolution: Motivation From Vandalism… …To Financial Gain Nation State Intelligence Intellectual Property Exfiltration Cyberterrorism
Page 1: Attacking Infrastructure Hacking Ex
Page 5: Evolution: Targets From PCs, modems
Page 8 and 9: Myth #10 Critical infrastructure is
Page 10 and 11: SCADA
Page 12 and 13: NIST SP800-82: Communications
Page 14 and 15: NIST SP800-82: Railway
Page 16 and 17: NIST SP800-82: Manufacturing
Page 27 and 28: SANS Diary: SCADA (Aug. 22, 2010)
Page 31 and 32: RTUs/MTUs/PLCs/HMIs/DAS/IED and mor
Page 35 and 36: Automated Teller Machines Processor
Page 37 and 38: Myth #7 Critical infrastructure run
Page 39 and 40: ATMs: Services Running (edited for
Page 41 and 42: Myth #6 These systems are secure (o
Page 43 and 44: Smart Meters: The OFF Switch July 2
Page 45 and 46: SCADA: Siemens database default pas
Page 47 and 48: 2x the 0-days in 2010 MSIE HTML Obj
Page 49 and 50: Stuxnet: Under the Hood • Discove
Page 51 and 52: How Stuxnet works… • When the f
Page 53 and 54:
Bypassing Detection • Creates the
Page 55 and 56:
MRXCLS.SYS 0xF8153747BAE8B4AE48837E
Page 57 and 58:
MRXNET.SYS 0x1E17D81979271CFA44D471
Page 59 and 60:
Stuxnet: Pilfering… • Connects
Page 61 and 62:
Stuxnet: Command and Control (C&C/C
Page 63 and 64:
Stuxnet: HELP • Siemens UPDATE -
Page 65 and 66:
Myth #5 Because they don’t run st
Page 67 and 68:
BlackHat 2010 - Las Vegas, NV
Page 69 and 70:
ATMs: Vulnerabilities (Cyber) July
Page 71 and 72:
BHO DEMO
Page 73 and 74:
Myth #3 Whatever problems exist, th
Page 75 and 76:
Public Transportation
Page 77 and 78:
Biomed: Implantable Medical Devices
Page 79 and 80:
Myth #3 Whatever problems exist, th
Page 81 and 82:
DOE report • May 2010 Report from
Page 83 and 84:
NERC (Project 2008-06 Cyber Securit
Page 85 and 86:
Myth #2 There is nothing we can do
Page 87 and 88:
BONUS?
Page 89 and 90:
Initial screen (blue pill or red pi
Page 91 and 92:
PCAP of ownage - User-Agent values
Page 93 and 94:
Owned - now grab Cydia, etc
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