Georgia Appellate Practice Handbook - Alston & Bird LLP

GEORGIA APPELLATE PRACTICE HANDBOOK
individual need not be presently confi ned to seek habeas corpus, if he or she can prove adverse
collateral consequences from a previous confi nement. 20
A writ of habeas corpus is not proper when another adequate remedy exists. 21 For example,
a writ will not issue when proceedings under which the petitioner is detained are still pending or
when other procedural remedies have yet to be exhausted. 22 An exception to this rule arises in the
case of committed mental patients, who have a statutory right to seek habeas corpus relief “at any
time.” 23 A writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, motion for new trial, writ
of error, or other remedial procedures for the correction of errors or irregularities alleged to have
been committed by a trial court. 24 Further, absent a change in either facts or law, issues decided on
appeal cannot be relitigated in habeas proceedings. 25 All grounds for habeas relief must be raised
in the fi rst petition unless the grounds are constitutionally nonwaivable or the grounds could not
reasonably have been raised in the fi rst petition. 26 Habeas corpus relief is not available for denial
of a nonconstitutional right secured by Georgia law. 27
Despite the broad language of O.C.G.A. § 9-14-1(b), a writ of habeas corpus may not be
used to effect a change of legal custody over a child. 28 Instead, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-23 provides the
exclusive remedy for seeking a change of custody in that context, and child custody case law prior
to the enactment of that statute in 1981 should be relied upon with caution. The current standard to
be used with respect to a change of legal custody is the best interests of the child. 29
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus remains the appropriate procedure, however, when an
individual with legal custody of a child seeks to enforce a child custody order or to remove the child
from wrongful custody. 30 Thus, such a petition is appropriate when the petitioner has permanent
20 Turner v. State, 284 Ga. 494, 495, 668 Ga. 692, 693 (2008); Tharpe v. Head, 272 Ga. 596, 597, 533
S.E.2d 368, 369 (2000).
21 Britt v. Conway, 281 Ga. 189, 189-90, 637 S.E.2d 43, 44 (2006); Kearse v. Paulk, 264 Ga. 509, 510, 448
S.E.2d 369, 370 (1994).
22 Tabor v. State, 279 Ga. 98, 99, 610 S.E.2d 59, 60 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Brown v.
Crawford, 289 Ga. 722, 724-25, 715 S.E.2d 132, 134 (2011).
23 O.C.G.A. § 37-3-148(a); see also Hogan v. Nagel, 273 Ga. 577, 578, 543 S.E.2d 705, 706 (2001).
24 Archer v. Grimes, 222 Ga. 8, 9, 148 S.E.2d 395, 396 (1966).
25 Roulain v. Martin, 266 Ga. 353, 353-54, 466 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1996).
26 O.C.G.A. § 9-14-51; Stevens v. Kemp, 254 Ga. 228, 230, 327 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1985); Dix v. Zant, 249
Ga. 810, 811, 294 S.E.2d 527, 528 (1982).
27 O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(a); Green v. Dunn, 257 Ga. 66, 355 S.E.2d 61 (1987).
28 Douglas v. Douglas, 285 Ga. 548, 550, 678 S.E.2d 904, 906 (2009).
29 Stills v. Johnson, 272 Ga. 645, 650, 533 S.E.2d 695, 701 (2000).
30 Douglas, 285 Ga. at 550, 678 S.E.2d at 906; Johnson v. Smith, 251 Ga. 1, 2, 302 S.E.2d 542, 543 (1983).
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