RFID-enabled Extensible Authentication Framework and Its ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Tag Reader Auth. Method Auth. Framework Air Interface Air AF AM Data (3) Nak-Response (5) Type[j]-Response (7) Type[k]-Response (1) Initiation (3) Nak-Response (5) Type[j]-Response (7) Type[k]-Response
packets between the tag and the middleware after checking the validity of AF header. For example, Request or Notification from the tag and Response from the middleware is invalid Code field. If the reader receives Identifier value that the reader has not initiated, the packet is should be discarded. Because the readers do not concern the Type and Datafield, they are compatible with various authentication methods in REAF. A typical authentication flow of our proposed framework is as follows. (1) R initiates an authentication by sending Initiation message to M. Identifier value is incremented from the previous value. (2) M starts the default authentication method, Type[i] where i ∈ {0, 4 : 255}. (a : b = {a, a + 1, . . . , b} where a < b) (3) If the default authentication method, Type[i] is satisfied with T , go to Step (5a) and assume j = i. Otherwise, T sends Nak = Type[1]. The Data field of Nak will be filled with authentication type set, T ypeSet where Type[1], Type[2], Type[3], Type[i] ∈ T ypeSet. (4) M selects an element Type[j] ∈ T ypeSet and re-initiate authentication process. Identifier value is not incremented. Go to Step (5b). (5a) T operates the Type[j] authentication method and responds with Type[j]-Response. Type[j] can be more than one round trip. (5b) If T receives (4) with the same Identifier after sending (3), it responds to (4) with Type[j]-Response. Depending on the Type[j], (4)-(5) can be more than one round trip. (6) (6)-(7) is not necessarily required, but another authentication type can be jointly used in this framework. Usually, in this case, Type[0] 24
Page 1 and 2: A Thesis for the Degree of Master R
Page 3 and 4: RFID-enabled Extensible Authenticat
Page 5 and 6: M.S. 20042055 Abstract Sungbae Ji R
Page 7 and 8: Contents Abstract i Contents iii Li
Page 9 and 10: List of Figures 3.1 REAF Message Pa
Page 11 and 12: DB Database List of Abbreviations E
Page 13 and 14: EK(str) Block cipher encryption of
Page 15 and 16: 1.1 Motivation and Objectives (1) A
Page 17 and 18: encryptions at the tag side which m
Page 19 and 20: II. Preliminaries 2.1 Security and
Page 21 and 22: Table 2.1: RFID Applications Applic
Page 23 and 24: GEs, 8,400 GEs, and 7,300 GEs respe
Page 25 and 26: tags against cloning. The EnhancedT
Page 27 and 28: the inventory response is contradic
Page 29 and 30: An RFID reader relays messages betw
Page 31 and 32: Moreover, readers and APs are the i
Page 33 and 34: 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
Page 35: authentication is done successfully
Page 39 and 40: IV. REAF Methods and Applications I
Page 41 and 42: Table 4.1: Comparison with other Ha
Page 43 and 44: On receiving BC-OA1-Response, M dec
Page 45 and 46: Table 4.2: Security Properties of R
Page 47 and 48: 4.3 Applications In this section, w
Page 49 and 50: V. Conclusion In this thesis, we pr
Page 51 and 52: RFID 시스템을 위한 확장가
Page 53 and 54: References 1. EPCglobal Inc, EPC Ra
Page 55 and 56: quency Identification Systems, Secu
Page 57 and 58: Acknowledgement This thesis is the
Page 59 and 60: Name : Sungbae Ji Date of Birth : O
Page 61 and 62: Publications (1) 2007.02 지성배,

RFID-enabled Extensible Authentication Framework and Its ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?