Recent Developments - Arkansas Law Review
Recent Developments - Arkansas Law Review
Recent Developments - Arkansas Law Review
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(16) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.DOC 4/23/2010 3:08:33 PM<br />
464 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:449<br />
result, the insurer need not show prejudice to avoid liability on<br />
the policy. On the other hand, when the requirement of notice is<br />
an ordinary contract promise, the insured’s noncompliance does<br />
not forfeit coverage under the policy unless the insurance<br />
company can demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the delay or<br />
lack of notice. The court noted, however, that an unreasonable<br />
delay in notice could in itself be prejudicial to the insurer. In<br />
reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly acknowledged that<br />
it was bucking the current trend toward requiring a showing of<br />
prejudice more frequently but felt compelled to reach its holding<br />
because “[i]n <strong>Arkansas</strong>, a condition precedent is still a condition<br />
precedent.” (citing Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn.<br />
1998)).<br />
To reach its conclusion in this case, the court turned to its<br />
prior precedent on the subject. From its first case addressing the<br />
issue, the <strong>Arkansas</strong> Supreme Court had not required the insurer<br />
to show prejudice when notice of a claim was a condition<br />
precedent to recovery. (citing Teutonia Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 72<br />
Ark. 484, 490, 82 S.W. 840, 842 (1903)). The court had not<br />
changed its position in subsequent cases. (citing Myers v. Mut.<br />
of Omaha Ins. Co., 253 Ark. 135, 136, 484 S.W.2d 879, 880<br />
(1972); Am. Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Ne. Ark. Bus Lines, Inc., 201<br />
Ark. 622, 623, 146 S.W.2d 165, 166 (1941); Pac. Mut. Life Ins.<br />
Co. v. Butler, 190 Ark. 282, 286, 78 S.W.2d 813, 815 (1935)).<br />
Further, the court had likewise required strict compliance from<br />
the insured when provisions other than notice were a condition<br />
precedent to coverage. (citing Vill. Mkt., Inc. v. State Farm Gen.<br />
Ins. Co., 333 Ark. 552, 557, 970 S.W.2d 243, 247 (1998)). On<br />
the other hand, the court had required a showing of prejudice on<br />
the part of the insurer when notice was not a condition precedent<br />
to coverage. (citing Home Indem. Co. v. Banfield Bros. Packing<br />
Co., 188 Ark. 683, 689, 67 S.W.2d 203, 206 (1934); Home Life<br />
& Acc. Co. v. Beckner, 168 Ark. 283, 288, 270 S.W. 529, 531<br />
(1925); Hope Spoke Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 102 Ark. 1, 8, 143<br />
S.W. 85, 87 (1912)). As a result, the court held that whether the<br />
insurer must show prejudice turns on whether the clause in<br />
question was a condition precedent.<br />
The court acknowledged that the confusion in the Eighth<br />
Circuit over <strong>Arkansas</strong> law on this point arose from three cases,<br />
each of which had imposed liability when an insurer had failed