Plotinus: Enneads - AwardSpace

Ennead I
First tractate: The animate and the man
Written by Plotinus, 253­270 A.D.
1. Pleasure and distress, fear and courage, desire and aversion,
where have these affections and experiences their seat?
Clearly, either in the Soul alone, or in the Soul as employing
the body, or in some third entity deriving from both. And for
this third entity, again, there are two possible modes: it might
be either a blend or a distinct form due to the blending.
And what applies to the affections applies also to whatsoever
acts, physical or mental, spring from them.
We have, therefore, to examine discursive­reason and the
ordinary mental action upon objects of sense, and enquire
whether these have the one seat with the affections and
experiences, or perhaps sometimes the one seat, sometimes
another.
And we must consider also our acts of Intellection, their mode
and their seat.
And this very examining principle, which investigates and
decides in these matters, must be brought to light.
Firstly, what is the seat of Sense­Perception? This is the
obvious beginning since the affections and experiences either
are sensations of some kind or at least never occur apart from
sensation.
2. This first enquiry obliges us to consider at the outset the
nature of the Soul­ that is whether a distinction is to be made
between Soul and Essential Soul [between an individual Soul
and the Soul­Kind in itself]. *
* All matter shown in brackets is added by the translator for
clearness' sake and, therefore, is not canonical. S.M.
If such a distinction holds, then the Soul [in man] is some sort
of a composite and at once we may agree that it is a recipient
and­ if only reason allows­ that all the affections and
experiences really have their seat in the Soul, and with the
affections every state and mood, good and bad alike.
But if Soul [in man] and Essential Soul are one and the same,