GAMI INVESTMENTS, INC. - NAFTAClaims
GAMI INVESTMENTS, INC. - NAFTAClaims
GAMI INVESTMENTS, INC. - NAFTAClaims
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Claimant.<br />
MR. PEREZCANO [Interpreted from Spanish]: Now, one of the<br />
measures claimed by <strong>GAMI</strong> is the standards for the sugar sector that apply<br />
to what we see on the screen, that is to say, this set of participants in<br />
the sugar sector, it applies to the committee, the sugar committee, the<br />
producers, the mills, but it does not cover the controlling corporations<br />
of the mills.<br />
Now, the other measure claimed in this procedure is<br />
expropriation, and that only covers 27 of the 61 sugar mills in Mexico.<br />
None of these applies to <strong>GAMI</strong> as a shareholder nor to the actions of GAM.<br />
In fact, none of these measures applies to any one of the shareholders of<br />
GAM or the controlling corporations of the sugar mills.<br />
Now, what GAM is claiming is harm to <strong>GAMI</strong>, and this is only a<br />
proportion of the damage to GAM which is being claimed in this procedure.<br />
The harm alleged by <strong>GAMI</strong> is the loss of value of the shares as a<br />
consequence of the loss of the total value of GAM given the application<br />
of the measures which are being contested. There is no harm that is<br />
independent to <strong>GAMI</strong> of any harm attributed to GAM. GAM and the sugar<br />
mills are Mexican companies, and they are owned by Mexicans, and they are<br />
controlled by Mexicans and, consequently, do not have any procedural<br />
legitimacy here and would not fall under the protection of NAFTA.<br />
I would like now to go to the first point which I referred to<br />
at the beginning of my presentation. Article 1101 of Chapter 11 clearly<br />
sets forth that it applies to measures that refer to investments from<br />
elsewhere of the other party and the actions of investments of the other<br />
party in the territory of the host nation.<br />
Now, here I wish to establish a clear difference as to how<br />
<strong>GAMI</strong> interprets Article 1101 and the clear text of the Article. <strong>GAMI</strong><br />
suggests that Article 1101, which sets forth the scope of the application<br />
of the Treaty, indicates that the chapter applies to investors of the<br />
other party, the investments of investors undertaken in the territory of<br />
the party, and performance in terms of the environment and the rest of<br />
the chapter.<br />
However, we must not ignore that Article 1101 establishes<br />
very clearly that the chapter applies to those measures which are adopted<br />
or applied to measures which are of the investments of the other party,<br />
the investments of these--of the other party, and as well as to<br />
performance requirements and environmental issues to all investments in<br />
the territory of the party. And what this sets forth is a very clear<br />
difference because Chapter 11, more than being a chapter on investment,<br />
is a chapter on government measures in regard to investors and<br />
investments.<br />
And the rules of interpreting treaties demand that the terms<br />
be given their common meaning within their context, and the principle of<br />
effectiveness means that the proper meaning needs to be given to each one<br />
of the terms.<br />
Thus, if the measures claimed do not go--are not relevant to<br />
the investor of another party or to the investor, they are outside of the<br />
scope of application of the Treaty and, consequently, the dispute does<br />
not fall under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.<br />
There is no question that none of the measures claimed by<br />
<strong>GAMI</strong> as we have seen apply to <strong>GAMI</strong> as a shareholder of GAM or of its<br />
shares. As I've already said, it does not apply to any of the<br />
shareholders of GAM or any of the controlling companies of the sugar<br />
mills, the regulatory framework of the sugar sector. And in reference to<br />
expropriation of the mills, the shareholders of these mills are<br />
completely--the matter is completely irrelevant.