The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy - Project MUSE

International Security 35:2 8
that this is their only purpose. The NPR deliberately leaves open the option for
the United States to use nuclear weapons to launch a preemptive—or, less
likely, a preventive—ªrst strike against Chinese, North Korean, Russian, and
(perhaps) future Iranian nuclear forces. Equally important, the United States
can still threaten the ªrst use of nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, respond,
to a variety of nonnuclear contingencies, including large-scale conventional
aggression by another nuclear power such as China or Russia, and
biological or chemical threats from states such as Iran and North Korea. 4
Finally, by failing to specify the circumstances under which the United States
might use nuclear weapons and instead only stipulating that nuclear weapons
would be used in “extreme circumstances” to protect “vital interests,” the NPR
has retained much of the imprecision and vagueness that was the hallmark of
the previous declaratory policy, commonly known as “calculated ambiguity.”
In this sense, the NPR’s new declaratory policy is little more than calculated
ambiguity by another name.
Declaratory policy became one of the most contentious issues of the NPR
process and was one of the reasons for the delay in the NPR’s release. Whereas
some members of the Obama administration advocated that the United States
retain maximum ºexibility and as many options as possible in its nuclear
policy, others contended that to fulªll the president’s vision set out in Prague,
the United States should adopt a more restrictive nuclear policy such as
no ªrst use (NFU), perhaps in the form of a declaration that the “sole purpose”
of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack. 5 Although the administration
considered several options for a new declaratory policy, the NPR ultimately
concluded that the United States was not prepared “at the present time
to adopt a universal policy that the ‘sole purpose’ of U.S. nuclear weapons is to
deter nuclear attack on the United States and our allies and partners, but will
work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely
adopted.” 6
4. Not surprisingly, Iran understood the implications of the new declaratory policy. Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei said, “The recent statement by the U.S. president . . . implicitly intimidates the Iranian
nation with the deployment of nuclear arms.” Khamenei continued, “The world should not ignore
it, because in the 21st century . . . the head of a state is threatening a nuclear attack.” See “Iran Rails
at New U.S. Nuclear Strategy,” Global Security Newswire, April 12, 2010; and Ali Akbar Dareini,
“Tehran Blasts Obama Ahead of Nuclear Summit,” Philadelphia Inquirer, April 12, 2010.
5. See, for example, David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “White House Is Rethinking Nuclear Policy,”
New York Times, February 28, 2010; “U.S. Seen Ruling Out ‘No First Use’ Nuke Policy,” Global
Security Newswire, March 1, 2010; Mary Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus, “Obama Must Decide
Degree to Which U.S. Swears Off Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, March 5, 2010; and Mary
Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus, “Obama Faces Tough Decision on Nuclear Weapons,” Washington
Post, March 6, 2010.
6. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, p. 16.