Warlordism in Comparative Perspective - MIT Press Journals

Warlordism in Comparative Perspective 59
both cases because of the spread of literacy, and in the Chinese case, with the
help of new propaganda tools that reached the illiterate.
These factors on their own may not have been sufªcient for the establishment
of stable governance structures in the aftermath of warlordism, but they
were crucial for movement in that direction. Hendrik Spruyt convincingly argues
that the end of feudalism (what I call warlordism) in Europe was a process
that is causally distinct from the rise of sovereign states, and that
alternative governance structures (such as city leagues and city-states) endured
for centuries before giving way to what are recognized today as states. 76
Furthermore, as Charles Tilly points out, state formation is a violent process
that harms the interests of many actors who rebel against it. The process often
ends in failure. 77 Both medieval Europe and Republican China were racked by
years of civil war in the transition from warlordism to what followed, and it
was ultimately the actors who controlled the most force who won.
I am therefore not making an argument about the causes of successful state
building. Instead I am arguing that if historical patterns retain their relevance
today, both economic grievance and the spread of revolutionary ideas are necessary
for warlordism to end.
the case of medieval europe
Scholars agree about why the dominance of feudal lords in medieval Europe
was overcome. 78 The process began when a sudden rise in productivity and
the proªtability of long-distance trade empowered a new merchant class to
seek markets farther from home. Merchants had an incentive to ªnd alternatives
to the arbitrary and parochial rule of feudal lords who otherwise made
the transaction costs of trade too high. These incentives created new opportunities
for political coalitions between merchants and kings, who needed to take
the power of taxation away from local lords to secure their own rule; and these
coalitions in turn provided new and more efªcient governance structures
over broader geographical areas. This revolution in political economy was
supported by the rediscovery of classical Roman law, whose universal sense
of justice and respect for private property challenged the previously domi-
76. Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors.
77. Charles Tilly, “Reºections on the History of European State-Making,” in Tilly, ed., The Formation
of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 3–83.
78. This includes the classic philosopher Max Weber, in “The Profession and Vocation of Politics”;
the Marxist Perry Anderson, in Lineages of the Absolutist State (New York: Verso, 1974); the historian
Joseph Strayer, in On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State; the sociologist Gianfranco Poggi, in
The Development of the Modern State; and the political scientist Hendrik Spruyt, in The Sovereign
State and Its Competitors.