damages for personal injury: non-pecuniary loss - Law Commission
damages for personal injury: non-pecuniary loss - Law Commission
damages for personal injury: non-pecuniary loss - Law Commission
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2.50 Support <strong>for</strong> the current practice generally rested on the view that the reasoning<br />
underlying it is sound, and that it represents a workable compromise. A higher rate<br />
to discourage delay by defendants would be unfair. It is often claimants who delay.<br />
They would be encouraged to do so by a punitive rate of interest. In any event it is<br />
a myth that the 2 per cent rate of interest is an incentive to defendants to delay.<br />
2.51 Those in favour of the net rate of return on ILGS gave a range of reasons <strong>for</strong> their<br />
view. Positive support <strong>for</strong> the ILGS rate tended to be on the basis of the arguments<br />
put <strong>for</strong>ward in the consultation paper. The 2 per cent rate was seen as out of touch<br />
and arbitrary. Consultees who supported the award of interest at a higher rate than<br />
ILGS essentially did so on the basis that this would encourage defendants to settle<br />
cases.<br />
2.52 Particularly in view of the lack of consensus amongst consultees on this issue, and<br />
certainly the lack of enthusiasm or persuasive argument <strong>for</strong> a much higher rate of<br />
interest, it seems to us that the main question in relation to the rate of interest on<br />
<strong>damages</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>non</strong>-<strong>pecuniary</strong> <strong>loss</strong> is whether it should be based on ILGS rates. In<br />
Wells v Wells 46<br />
the House of Lords supported the recommendation in our Report<br />
on Structured Settlements and Interim and Provisional Damages 47<br />
that ILGS rates<br />
be used in the calculation of future <strong>pecuniary</strong> <strong>loss</strong>. Their Lordships held that 3 per<br />
cent should be the guideline rate upon which discounts are based, subject, of<br />
course, to a different rate being specified by the Lord Chancellor under section 1<br />
of the Damages Act 1996. 48<br />
It would seem to follow that if the rate of interest on<br />
<strong>damages</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>non</strong>-<strong>pecuniary</strong> <strong>loss</strong> should be based on ILGS rates, the actual rate<br />
adopted should be 3, rather than 2, per cent.<br />
2.53 As we have said above, 49<br />
the argument of principle <strong>for</strong> increasing the rate of<br />
interest on <strong>damages</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>non</strong>-<strong>pecuniary</strong> <strong>loss</strong> to 3 per cent is that ILGS provides the<br />
best evidence of the <strong>loss</strong> to the claimant through being kept out of his or her<br />
<strong>damages</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>non</strong>-<strong>pecuniary</strong> <strong>loss</strong>.<br />
2.54 There is a counter-argument of principle. As we have also said above, 50<br />
in theory<br />
interest should only be awarded on <strong>damages</strong> <strong>for</strong> past <strong>non</strong>-<strong>pecuniary</strong> <strong>loss</strong>. Since<br />
interest is awarded on the whole sum of <strong>damages</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>non</strong>-<strong>pecuniary</strong> <strong>loss</strong> (and we<br />
do not recommend that this be changed), it may be argued that, even if ILGS is<br />
the right starting point, the ILGS rate should be discounted. This would be a<br />
source of injustice where the claimant was awarded <strong>damages</strong> <strong>for</strong> past <strong>non</strong><strong>pecuniary</strong><br />
<strong>loss</strong> only. However, the magnitude of that injustice would most probably<br />
be slight, given that in such circumstances the sum of interest involved is very<br />
46 [1998] 3 WLR 329.<br />
47 (1994) <strong>Law</strong> Com No 224.<br />
48 Or, in the absence of action by the Lord Chancellor, to there being a significant change in<br />
economic circumstances justifying a new guideline by the courts. See [1998] 3 WLR 329,<br />
355 (Lord Steyn) & 370 (Lord Hutton). Lord Hope at 360 stated that adjustments and the<br />
timing of them should now be left to the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State <strong>for</strong><br />
Scotland, in the exercise of the power conferred on them by section 1 of the Damages Act<br />
1996.<br />
49 See para 2.46 above.<br />
50 See paras 2.33, 2.37 & 2.45 above.<br />
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