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Huang, C. , Luther, R. , Tayles, M. and Haniffa, R. - UWE Research ...

Huang, C. , Luther, R. , Tayles, M. and Haniffa, R. - UWE Research ...

Huang, C. , Luther, R. , Tayles, M. and Haniffa, R. - UWE Research ...

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managers in the UK contact companies privately to seek information on management<br />

quality <strong>and</strong> succession plans. In short, studies on the dem<strong>and</strong> side in developed<br />

markets revealed that human capital information is indeed important in valuing<br />

companies‟ performance <strong>and</strong> often users need to seek for such information privately.<br />

Corporate reporting theories<br />

One of the objectives of financial reporting is to provide relevant information to users<br />

to aid their decision making. Since it is costly to satisfy the dem<strong>and</strong> for information<br />

of all stakeholders, companies tend to fulfil the needs of their primary stakeholders<br />

especially the investment community. However, much of the accounting information<br />

produced by the traditional historical cost accounting system has limited use for<br />

making investment decisions. Accordingly, to enhance the decision usefulness of<br />

corporate reporting, companies are increasingly supplementing m<strong>and</strong>atory financial<br />

reports with voluntary disclosures about intellectual capital, including human capital<br />

(Holl<strong>and</strong> 2003). Theories explaining the decision by companies to voluntarily<br />

disclose supplementary human capital information include decision usefulness,<br />

agency, stakeholder, legitimacy, resource-based <strong>and</strong> resource dependence.<br />

Decision usefulness theory, as theorised by Bebbington et al. (2001), explains<br />

that in order to provide useful information, companies need to identify <strong>and</strong> fulfil the<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> from various stakeholders for information that will help them in assessing<br />

management efficiency <strong>and</strong> the future value of the companies. However, to avoid<br />

information overload <strong>and</strong> loss of competitive advantage, companies tend to only<br />

supply information that is perceived to be „useful‟.<br />

Agency theory explains how information asymmetry between principals <strong>and</strong><br />

agent may impair the efficient allocation of capital (Diamond <strong>and</strong> Verrecchia, 1991),<br />

leading to higher costs of capital (Botosan <strong>and</strong> Plumlee, 2002). <strong>Tayles</strong> et al. (2007) in

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