Cumulative Deterrence and it's implementations to the War against ...

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Russett adopted Patrick Morgan’s basic conceptualization of deterrence, which has two components: general deterrence and immediate deterrence. General deterrence characterizes relations between states that view each other’s motives with suspicion and hostility over an extended period of time. Immediate deterrence involves specific crises that threaten to erupt into full-scale war. 13 According to Huth and Russett, such crises can result from the breakdown of general deterrence; this breakdown occurs over the following five stages: (1) adoption by the defender of a strategy of general deterrence; (2) emergence of a challenge by a rival that threatens the status quo; (3) adoption by the defender of a strategy of immediate deterrence; (4) continued threats from the rival; and (5) the failure of immediate deterrence, which causes the defender to consider a military response. Using Morgan’s definitions of general deterrence and immediate deterrence, Huth and Russett regard a continuing conflict as one that has lasted at least twenty years during which the adversaries engage in no fewer than five battles. Examples include Israel and Egypt from 1948 to 1979, Israel and Lebanon from 1948 to 2000, and Israel and Syria from 1948 to the present. Maoz defines a continuing conflict as one that extends beyond twenty-five years, with a maximum gap of ten years between clashes; if this period is longer than ten years, the conflict is considered continuous only if the territorial issue at stake remains unresolved and there is at least one military exchange within a twenty-five-year period. 14 Examples include Israel and Jordan from 1948 to 1994, Israel and Lebanon from 1976 to 2000, and Israel and Syria from 1974 to the present. Cumulative deterrence works on two levels. On the macro level, it seeks to create an image of overwhelming military supremacy. On the micro level, it relies on specific military responses to specific threats or hostile acts. Cumulative deterrence has several key features. First, its effectiveness is measured in terms of the number of victories accumulated over the duration of the conflict, which I refer to as “assets in a victory bank.” Second, over time these victories produce increasingly moderate behavior on the part of the adversary and a shift in its strategic, operational, and tactical goals until there is a near-absence of direct conflict. Third, this 13. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models,” American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 1 (March 1993), pp. 61–73. 14. Zeev Maoz, Domestic Norms, Structural Constraints, and Enduring Rivalries in the Middle East, 1948–1988, in David Garnham and Mark Tessler, eds., Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 170–194. 6
moderation may eventually result in political negotiations and perhaps even a peace agreement. Table 1 summarizes the main differences between classical and cumulative deterrence. Table 1. Classical Deterrence versus Cumulative Deterrence Logic Classical Deterrence Dichotomic approach Cumulative Deterrence Nondichotomic approach Related threat Nuclear Conventional Measurements of success Total prevention of conflict Main weaknesses Irrelevant to conventional conflicts and limited conflicts Main strengths Could prevent nuclear war between rational rivals Tactical: scoring success by accumulating victories Operational: shaping new conditions Strategic: creating a basis for an improved strategic situation Accelerates the “designing around” phenomenon Requires a complementary strategy that includes efforts to transform the adversary’s political, economic, and social systems Enriches the conceptual basis of deterrence strategy Enables reuse of deterrence strategy with regard to national security Figure 1 offers a graphic illustration of the expected gains and losses of cumulative deterrence over time. 7
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Cumulative Deterrence and it's implementations to the War against ...

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