G:\BobX3\2011-12\Fraserside. set aside deafult ... - Letters Blogatory

Case 3:11-cv-03005-MWB Document 20 Filed 07/12/11 Page 14 of 20
Greek translation, coupled with the difficulties it experienced in locating and securing local
Iowa counsel to represent it. Fraserside responds that Youngtek’s conduct does not
constitute excusable neglect warranting setting aside the default.
a. Legal Standards
Rule 55(c) expressly provides that “[t]he court may set aside an entry of default for
good cause. . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c) (emphasis added); see Stephenson v. El-Batrawi,
524 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c)). “When examining
whether good cause exists, the district court should weigh ‘whether the conduct of the
defaulting party was blameworthy or culpable, whether the defaulting party has a
meritorious defense, and whether the other party would be prejudiced if the default were
excused.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir.
1998)). I examine each of these factors, in turn. In doing so, I am mindful that “default
judgment is not favored by the law,” United States v. Harre, 983 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir.
1993), and “should be a ‘rare judicial act.’” Comiskey v. JFTJ Corp., 989 F.2d 1007, 1009
(8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1977)).
b. Analysis
i. Blameworthiness or culpability
First, I examine Youngtek’s culpability or blameworthiness in failing to file a timely
response to the complaint. I must “focus heavily on the blameworthiness of the defaulting
party.” Johnson, 140 F.3d at 784. I must also distinguish conduct that is “contumacious”
or demonstrates an “intentional delay or disregard for deadlines and procedural rules,”
from conduct that involves only a “marginal failure to meet pleading or other deadlines.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has “rarely, if ever,
excused the former.” Id.
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