Orsi v. Falah (D. Mass. 2012) - Letters Blogatory

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Case 1:11-cv-10451-DPW Document 11 Filed 09/25/12 Page 12 of 18 In the now-classic formulation, due process requires that a defendant “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum of suit] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Under the “purposeful availment” requirement, a defendant must have “deliberately” created a “substantial connection” with the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific. “General jurisdiction exists when the litigation is not directly founded on the defendant's forum-based contacts, but the defendant has nevertheless engaged in continuous and systematic activity, unrelated to the suit, in the forum state.” United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1088 (1st Cir. 1992). “Specific personal jurisdiction, by contrast, is narrower in scope and may only be relied upon ‘where the cause of action arises directly out of, or relates to, the defendant's forum-based contacts.’” Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting United Elec. Workers, 960 F.2d at 1088–1089). Orsi cites only section 3(d) of the Long Arm Statute, which authorizes general jurisdiction over a defendant who “causes tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct” inside the commonwealth. I will give Orsi the benefit of the doubt that he -12-
Case 1:11-cv-10451-DPW Document 11 Filed 09/25/12 Page 13 of 18 also meant to invoke section 3(a), which permits specific jurisdiction "over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's . . . transacting any business" in Massachusetts. 3 In any event, Orsi is far from making the specific allegations necessary to establish either general or specific jurisdiction. B. Analysis Orsi’s complaint is not a model of clarity, but I have culled what appear to be all the relevant allegations that might support personal jurisdiction over Al-Nahyan. 1. Orsi Orsi’s jurisdictional allegations all concern Al-Nahyan’s contacts with Orsi (as opposed to other unrelated contacts with Massachusetts that might support general jurisdiction). As a result, the time frame for contacts establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Massachusetts is limited by when Orsi had any connection to Massachusetts. So, before even turning to Al-Nahyan’s contacts, I must examine Orsi’s own contacts with Massachusetts--a topic about which he provides only the slightest detail. The core allegations of the complaint travel to Switzerland, Italy, and New York. The only apparent connection to 3 Despite the statutory language, the Massachusetts test for specific jurisdiction parallels the federal. Foster–Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 144 n.3 (1st Cir. 1995) (“transacting any business” and “arising from” elements of section 3(a) of the Long Arm Statute correspond to the federal constitutional requirements of “minimum contacts” and “relatedness”). -13
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Orsi v. Falah (D. Mass. 2012) - Letters Blogatory

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