Breaking SAP Portal - Proidea

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Investigation • No traces of change in default log files \cluster\server0\log\system\httpaccess\responses.log • Webdynpro sends all data by POST, and we only see GET URLs in responses.log • But sometimes we can find information by indirect signs [Mar 20, 2013 9:35:49 AM ] - 172.16.0.63 : GET /webdynpro/resources/sap.com/tc~lm~webadmin~log_config~wd/Components/com.sa p.tc.log_configurator.LogConfigurator/warning.gif HTTP/1.1 200 110 • Client loaded images from server during some changes
Investigation • Most actions have icons • They have to be loaded from the server • Usually, legitimate users have them all in cache • Attackers usually don’t have them, so they make requests to the server • That’s how we can identify potentially malicious actions • But there should be correlation with a real user’s activity • False positives are possible: •New legitimate user •Old user clears cache •Other
Page 1 and 2: Invest in security to secure invest
Page 3 and 4: Evgeny Neyolov
Page 5 and 6: SAP security Agenda SAP forensics W
Page 7 and 8: SAP security Espionage Stealing fin
Page 9 and 10: How easy? SAP Security Notes http:/
Page 11 and 12: What about unpublished threats? •
Page 13 and 14: What do we see? • A lot of resear
Page 15 and 16: Say hello to Portal • Point of we
Page 17 and 18: Okay, okay. SAP Portal is important
Page 19 and 20: Full logging is not always the best
Page 21 and 22: SAP Management Console • SAP MC -
Page 23 and 24: SAP Management Console true
Page 25 and 26: Prevention • The HTTP Provider se
Page 27 and 28: Declarative By WEB.XML Access contr
Page 29 and 30: web.xml CriticalAction com.sap.adm
Page 31 and 32: Verb Tampering Need Admin account i
Page 33 and 34: Investigation [Apr 3, 2013 1:23:59
Page 35 and 36: Invoker Servlet • Want to execute
Page 37 and 38: Prevention • Update to the latest
Page 39 and 40: Investigation
Page 41 and 42: EPCF EPCF provides a JavaScript API
Page 43 and 44: Investigation #Plain###192.168.192.
Page 45: Webdynpro JAVA http://help.sap.com/
Page 49 and 50: Directory traversal fix bypass
Page 51 and 52: ../ !252f..!252f Investigation
Page 53 and 54: Read file How we can read the file?
Page 55 and 56: XXE in Portal
Page 57 and 58: XXE Error based XXE
Page 59 and 60: $internal/version=Ni4zFF4wMSeasefor
Page 61 and 62: Prevention • Install SAP note 161
Page 63 and 64: Investigation • The only one way
Page 65 and 66: Malicious file upload: Attack http:
Page 67 and 68: Malicious file upload: Forensics [A
Page 69 and 70: Portal post exploitation • Lot of
Page 71 and 72: SSRF Attack Direct attack GET /vuln
Page 73 and 74: Portal post-exploitation
Page 75 and 76: • Flooding • Deleting • Chang
Page 77 and 78: Log deleting • Flooding is the su
Page 79 and 80: Log archiving • Archiving when al
Page 81 and 82: Securing SAP Portal • Patching
Page 83 and 84: Future work I'd like to thank SAP's

Breaking SAP Portal - Proidea

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