Space and Verification

Space Treaty Verification Mechanisms
Objective: The objective of this study is to assess the ability of current technologies
to verify adherence to space treaties and conventions, and conceive requirements for
verification techniques and processes. The intent, where ever possible, is to have treaties
that can be verified technically and for the relevant data to be internationally available.
Background: A companion political and legal study will develop candidate treaty and
convention vehicles the critical elements of which can be credibly verified using current
technologies.
That study will investigate the historical background, technological feasibility, and
implications for national security policy of any international agreement requiring states to
exercise restraint in their space activities, either through declaratory policy, informally
agreed or binding “rules of the road,” or formal international agreements limiting
weapons or activities in space. It will assess a range of potential verification options to
support an expanded set of international norms to protect interests in space and achieve a
commonly understood level of spaceflight safety. The appendix presents relevant
alternative perceptions from the technical community.
Approach:
Verification assesses adherence to the provisions of an agreement. Therefore, we must
conjecture what such provisions might be, such as the equivalent of "trespass," denying a
legal owner the benefits of his property. Next, we must identify what is observable in
order to perceive an untoward act. One such event might be unplanned or clearly
anomalous changes in the orbit of a satellite. Then, what technical capabilities are able to
gather those observations, how well, and how often?
This is accomplished parametrically, since as technologists we cannot presume to judge
what might be sufficient for diverse national interests.
We also focus on civil and commercial means rather than National Technical Means.
One reason is that verification itself should be transparent to stakeholders. The
observations and inferences of the verification system should not be arguable. They will
all be uncertain to some degree, but the uncertainty can and should be quantified. These
capabilities are ubiquitous, operated and controlled by diverse authorities and responsible
parties. No single authority or stakeholder could prevent the collective perception. Since
these capabilities demonstrate a stake in the collective success, there should be sincere
collaboration. Since owning or operating these systems is a much less intense investment
than actually developing, launching, or operating satellites, nations with limited resources
could also contribute. We call these "Persistent Technical Means."
Space treaties must consider the three major mission elements: launch, on-orbit operations,
and disposal or re-entry. We examine each independently.