Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation ...

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The amounts of these overages, according to Russian figures, and comparisons among the last three data exchanges and notifications are shown in the charts below. In all cases, Russian data and notifications have been adjusted to also include the items improperly excluded from data, but do not account for excess decommissioned items. Overages above Adapted Treaty Flank Limits on Russian Territory: Tanks ACV Artillery Future limits 1300 2140 1680 Jan 2002 Overages At least 5 0 0 July 2002 Overages 0 0 0 Jan 2003 Overages 0 0 0 July 2003 Overages 0 0 0 Headroom as of July 2003 1 Over 70 Almost 80 Over 200 Overages above Current Treaty Limits for Active Units in the Revised Flank Zone: 2 Tanks ACV Artillery Current active limits 700 580 1280 Jan 2002 Overages Over 750 Over 2000 Over 500 3 July 2002 Overages Over 650 Almost 2000 Over 460 Jan 2003 Overages Almost 700 Almost 2050 Close to 500 July 2003 Overages Close to 700 Over 2000 Almost 450 Overages above Current Treaty Flank Limits for the Original Flank Zone: Tanks ACV Artillery Current total limits 1800 3700 2400 Jan 2002 Overages 0 At least some 475 0 July 2002 Overages 0 At least some 700 0 Jan 2003 Overages 0 At least almost 750 0 July 2003 Overages 0 At least almost 600 0 Headroom as of July 2003 Almost 200 N/A Over 300 1 Headroom, a term with important meaning in the Adapted Treaty, refers to the difference between the limit for a category of TLE and the number actually present in a State Party’s armed forces or in a specified territorial unit or subunit. 2 The active-unit overages were significantly increased in late 1999 in part because of the conflict in Chechnya, and in part because the new Russian data declared all flank TLE to be in active units, the limits for which are lower now than under the future limits of an adapted Treaty. In this and other matters, Russia has acted as if the Agreement on Adaptation had already entered into force and modified (“adapted”) the Treaty, but the Agreement has not done so, there is no authority to provisionally apply the Agreement in whole or in part and no State Party may unilaterally apply future provisions that are not yet in force. 3 These overage figures do not take into account Russian notifications of temporary deployments in Armenia, Ukraine, and Georgia and on Russian territory in the original flank -- some of which may no longer be entirely valid. 43
Nevertheless, there are concerns that Russia may not be declaring properly the total number of ACVs in the adapted flank area. First there is the question of APCs that are being used to transport combat infantry squads, but which are claimed improperly to be “ambulances” as discussed earlier. A second concern relates vehicles that are being declared as MT-LBT APC look-alikes but are configured and used as MT-LB APCs. (Physically the only significant and readily visible difference between the MT-LB APC and the MT-LBT APC look-alike is that the inside of the MT-LB contains passenger seats on both sides allowing transport of a full infantry squad, while the MT-LBT contains artillery ammunition racks instead of seats on the left side, and is a towed artillery primemover with seats only for the smaller gun crew. Both versions existed in the Soviet (and Russian) inventory prior to entry into force of the Treaty. According to the POET, for 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty, an MT-LB could be modified into an MT-LBT against reduction obligations by altering the interior of the vehicle through removal of the left-hand combat infantry squad seating and the welding of the ammunition racking to the side and floor at a minimum of six points. To replace seats with ammunition racks, or vice-versa, is a simple procedure that can be easily carried out at the holding unit level.) This practice could lead to declarations of artificially lower holdings of ACVs for the units in question and for the adapted flank area as a whole. a) During a U.S.-led inspection in February 2002, Russian escorts claimed that some 40 “may have been deployed to Chechnya.” Inspectors observed some 40 ammunition racks of the type used in MT-LBT APC look-alikes stacked in a storage shed. b) On October 1-2, 2002, a U.S.-led inspection examined more than 60 MT- LBTs that may have returned from Chechnya. The welds of the ammunition racks of all of these MT-LBTs appeared to have been completed only recently, and a few of the vehicles required additional welds to complete the process of modification. This raises another complex issue. The footnote in the POET that allowed nations to receive credit for “reducing” MT-LB APCs via modification into MT-LBT APC lookalikes had only a 40-month duration – the 40 months of the CFE reduction period, during which the groups of states were required to destroy or otherwise eliminate equipment in excess of agreed ceilings according to methods specified in the Treaty. The MB-LT modification allowed a limited exceptional reduction mechanism in order to reach limits. However, the Treaty is silent on what can or must be done to eliminate TLE from accountability beyond the reduction period of the Treaty, which ended in 1995, nor does it specify how decommissioned items can be disposed of. Accepted practice over the life of the Treaty after the Treaty reduction period offers some answers. Several NATO allies have notified reductions below limits that involved TLE being converted to other non- TLE (or even other non-Treaty-reportable) items that would continue to be used militarily, and no nation has raised an objection in the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG), the Treaty’s implementation body. Similarly, during recent Russian conversions of MT-LB vehicles that changed the mix of TLE and TLE look-alikes, no nation has 44
Page 1 and 2: ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH AR
Page 3 and 4: B. The Treaty on Conventional Armed
Page 5 and 6: effort, seriousness, and rigor that
Page 7 and 8: This Report marks the first time th
Page 9 and 10: principles and values. To that end,
Page 11 and 12: arms control and nonproliferation r
Page 13 and 14: exchanges, and other cooperative me
Page 15 and 16: warheads, as defined by Article II
Page 17 and 18: 1 and 9 of Article VI of the Treaty
Page 19 and 20: topics are: • the adoption of nec
Page 21 and 22: From 1993 to the present, military
Page 23 and 24: Based on the same body of reporting
Page 25 and 26: conducted after the end of the firs
Page 27 and 28: about possession as a deterrent to
Page 29 and 30: NORTH KOREA ISSUE. We continue to h
Page 31 and 32: emain largely intact and may suppor
Page 33 and 34: The United States discussed Russia
Page 35 and 36: B. THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED
Page 37 and 38: had notified for destruction or con
Page 39 and 40: at a Russian Armor Maintenance Faci
Page 41 and 42: suggest improper use of equipment a
Page 43 and 44: Ministers signed a Joint Statement
Page 45: sets alongside the other equipment
Page 49 and 50: sufficient evidence to support Russ
Page 51 and 52: UKRAINE Active Unit Limits. As note
Page 53 and 54: supposed to be distributed on Decem
Page 55 and 56: governing the implementation of the
Page 57 and 58: esearch undertaken for the purpose
Page 59 and 60: We continue to believe that Iran ha
Page 61 and 62: RUSSIA ISSUE. The principal issue i
Page 63 and 64: its stockpile declaration. A team o
Page 65 and 66: The United States assesses that Sud
Page 67 and 68: Article II Under Article II, NNWS P
Page 69 and 70: enhanced use of existing authoritie
Page 71 and 72: standards, insofar as some noncompl
Page 73 and 74: proliferation-sensitive enrichment
Page 75 and 76: should extend to personnel as well
Page 77 and 78: view of the contract Iran is negoti
Page 79 and 80: ecause this nuclear program makes l
Page 81 and 82: COMPLIANCE-RELATED DIALOGUE AND ANA
Page 83 and 84: continues to build a heavy water pr
Page 85 and 86: y unilaterally destroying and buryi
Page 87 and 88: design and the role of Iraqi securi
Page 89 and 90: Libya’s longstanding interest in
Page 91 and 92: Declaration on the Denuclearization
Page 93 and 94: On December 29, 2002, the DPRK Fore
Page 95 and 96: “[s]ince 1994, the DPRK has sough
Page 97 and 98:
States Parties as new (and often un
Page 99 and 100:
satisfy Annex I requirements. Durin
Page 101 and 102:
observed State Party, including are
Page 103 and 104:
adherence to common export policy g
Page 105 and 106:
focused increasingly on new ideas f
Page 107 and 108:
ground-to-ground missiles “inhere
Page 109 and 110:
countries. In addition, Chinese ent
Page 111:
such transfers are not directly bar
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