The Expanded Nontraditional Role of the AFP - National Defense ...

and development strategy of the AFP, which
resulted in significant results for the counterinsurgency
campaign. The government aimed
to decisively defeat the communist insurgency
using the triad concept of civil military operations,
combat operations, and intelligence operations.
The plan was so successful that it cleared
13,000 affected communities between 1988 and
1994, but it encountered problems with the economic
development phase. 6
The other extreme of the transformed
nontraditional role continued throughout
the Aquino administration. Military rebels
led by Colonel Gregorio Honasan launched a
series of attempted power grabs between 1986
and 1989 that all failed. Accusing Aquino of
being too friendly with the Left, Honasan and
his cohorts aimed to form a ruling civilianmilitary
junta wherein the military would
play a major role.
The administration of Fidel Ramos took
over from the Aquino regime in 1992 and
immediately sought to make peace with any
insurgent group that was receptive to the
offer. Ramos, a graduate of the U.S. Military
Academy at West Point, was a former general
and defense chief who understood the importance
of achieving strategic peace before any
meaningful political stability and economic
progress could take place. As chief of the
Philippine constabulary for 14 years, Ramos
understood the effectiveness of security and
development toward achieving the goals of his
administration. If Aquino’s watch was plagued
by one coup attempt after another, the Ramos
presidency experienced no such threat.
Ramos made strategic peace with military
rebels in 1992, appealing to them instead
to positively affect Philippine development
through nonviolent means. As a result, Letter
of Instruction 42/94, “Unlad-Bayan,” was
Role of the afP
launched. This letter was the campaign plan
for the development or nation-building role of
the AFP. It sought to rectify where “Lambat-
Bitag” had failed. Specifically, the plan advocated
the lead agency concept, involvement
of civic and sectoral organizations and military
commanders at all levels, delivery of
basic services, AFP economic development
projects (livelihood projects), cooperative
development, disaster preparedness, use of
reservists, AFP modernization (anchored on
self-reliance), and environmental protection
and preservation. 7 The Army Concern on
Community Organizing for Development, for
instance, was in line with the implementation
of “Unlad-Bayan.”
After attaining peace with the military
rebels, Ramos next made peace with the
MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, in 1996. Although
it appeared as if Ramos was making peace
with the enemies of the state one by one,
the fact was that governmental peace overtures
were offered to various insurgent groups
almost simultaneously. Even while meaningful
progress had already been achieved with the
military rebels and MNLF, there were likewise
ongoing peace talks with the CPP/NPA and
MILF. In fact, inroads toward achieving a similar
peace accord as that sealed with the MNLF
were already in the works when the Ramos
administration had to put everything on hold
as it turned over power to Joseph Estrada, who
succeeded Ramos in 1998.
Ramos took advantage of the generally progressive
political and economic atmosphere by
issuing a change in approach. 8 He hoped to turn
the counterinsurgency over to the Philippine
National Police, thus allowing the AFP to focus
on modernizing itself in order to become capable
of deterring external aggression after decades
of addressing internal rebellion.
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