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indistinguishable. This being the case, whatever the nonspatial relation between a given Cartesian mind and a given body, it is logically possible that there are other Cartesian minds that stand in exactly the same relation to this very same body. In Strawson’s apt formulation “uniqueness of the body does not guarantee uniqueness of the Cartesian soul” (1959, 101). It follows that, given realism, it is impossible to apply the spatio-temporal account of individuation to Cartesian minds even indirectly. This being the case realism entails that no answer can be given to the question wherein the identity or diversity of Cartesian minds consists. But without an answer to this question the idea of Cartesian minds would not not really make sense. For such an answer is partially constitutive of the meaning of sortals like this idea (Lowe 1989, 24-5). Thus, realism renders the idea of Cartesian minds unintelligible. 9 Unlike the supposed non-spatiality of Cartesian minds the fact that such minds are supposed to be ontologically structured is not a very central feature of the Cartesian conception. Thus, unlike the conflict between this conception and trope theory, which is due to the former feature, its clash with extreme nominalism, which is due to the latter feature, may be resolved by simply forgoing this very feature. However, such a course will not remedy the Cartesian conception. For extreme nominalism must allow for the possibility of there being distinct yet absolutely alike Cartesian minds. Otherwise it will have extremely implausible consequences – e.g., that distinct yet very similar minds, which it certainly must allow, merge into one mind when becoming, as they certainly can, absolutely alike. But then, problems analogous to those that realism faces with respect to the individuation of Cartesian minds, will also inflict extreme nominalism. And this means that this view as well renders the notion of Cartesian minds unintelligible. 10 To sum up, then, the Cartesian conception must assume either nominalism or realism, since these ontological views are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive. However, if it assumes either extreme nominalism or trope theory it is incoherent. And if it assumes either extreme nominalism or realism it is unintelligible. Thus, the Cartesian conception is either incoherent or unintelligible or both. 1 1 Many thanks to Dalia Drai, Jerome Gellman and Hami Verbin for thei helpful comments. Cartesian Minds - Yakir Levin References Armstrong, D.M. 1989 Universals, Boulder: Westview Press. Chalmers, D.J. 1995 The Conscious Mind, Oxford: OUP. Goodman N. 1983 Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Cambridge MA: Harvard UP. Hamlyn, D.W. 1984 Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Loux, M.J. (ed.) 1970 Universals and Particulars, New York: Anchor Books. Loux, M.J. 1978 Substance and Attribute, Dordrecht: Reidel. Loux, M.J. 1998 Metaphysics, London: Routledge. Lowe, E.J. 1989 Kinds of Being, Oxford: Blackwell. Mellor, D.H. and Oliver, A. (eds.) 1997 Properties, Oxford: OUP. Rutherford, D. 1995 Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, New York: Cambridge UP. Strawson, P. 1959 Individuals, London: Methuen. Strawson, P. 1997 Entity and Identity, Oxford: Clarendon. Garber, D. and Ayers, M. (eds.) 1998 The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy Vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 135
Are There Philosophical Answers to Psychiatric Questions? Paul B. Lieberman, Leston Havens Contemporary psychiatry has only one generally accepted model, that of biological – materialist explanation and treatment. But clinicians recognize that this model omits much that is important and they therefore confront a dilemma: either limit their practice to an incomplete model, or use other models which seem unfounded and speculative. Philosophical considerations may help clinicians find a way out 1) by showing the inherent limitations of biological – materialist explanations, and 2) by grounding other (psychotherapeutic) approaches on general considerations of how the mind, and in particular language, works. These general considerations include: the dependence of meaning upon environmental context, the attribution of meaning as involving sets of skills, capacities and reactions, the multiplicity of language games and therefore their individual limitations, the dependence of meaning upon our shared interests, the largely unconscious nature of mind and our necessary limitations to public criteria for mental events and processes. 1. The Hegemony of the Biological – Materialist Model in Contemporary Psychiatry American psychiatry is now firmly committed to a nearly exclusive focus on biological – materialist models of psychiatric conditions and their treatment. This hegemony of biological approaches, and the ‘descriptive’ approaches which are intended to lay the groundwork for biological explanation and treatment, has been commented upon by many authors – both inside and outside of psychiatry. Pharmacological and other biological treatments, such as electroconvulsive therapy, are often effective, particularly for more severe disorders where other types of treatments, such as psychotherapies, have not shown consistent benefit. But this exclusive focus has also created unease among psychiatrists and their patients. Psychiatry, after all, purports to be the branch of clinical practice which treats the whole person. The exclusive focus on biological – materialist interests has excluded many areas of patients’ lives from clinical compass. Despite these reservations, however, for the working clinician, biological approaches seem to possess an important advantage: a clear model which is easy to understand and use. This is the model of the interlocking biological sciences: chemistry grounding physiology, physiological systems organized anatomically, disorders localized at particular points in the causal chain located inside the body. It has been spectacularly successful throughout medicine. By contrast, there is no generally accepted, readily teachable and empirically grounded model to guide other therapeutic approaches in psychiatry. Thus, the clarity and convincingness of the biological model, and the absence of any accepted and validated alternative among the psychological therapies, have contributed to the hegemony of biological approaches in clinical work. This leaves psychiatrists with a dilemma: either adhere to the biological – materialist model which seems logically invincible but clinically incomplete, or use other clinical methods (the 136 psychotherapies) which are felt to be more hypothetical, less scientific and even, from a biological perspective, superfluous or frivolous. In what follows, we shall attempt to use recent philosophical considerations to support two conclusions: 1) the biological – materialist model, rather than being necessarily valid, is in fact incomplete and inadequate, and 2) other psychological approaches to clinical understanding and treatment can be founded on very general features of mental life, and, therefore, should not be considered “hypothetical.” 2. Problems with the Biological – Materialist Model in Psychiatry If the biological – materialist view of mind is inadequate or wrong, we should expect that there might be many ways in which it fails to fit or represent reality. And, in fact, philosophers have noted several. First, the biological or materialist conception of mind cannot explain or model human action. Action seems to involve the causal efficacy of psychological events or processes: our thoughts, beliefs and wishes. But if such thoughts, beliefs and wishes are identified with biological states of the brain, then it is those material states which are causal, and the experienced psychological states merely ‘drop out’ in terms of their causal efficacy. Moreover, it is completely obscure how a thought, belief or wish, conceived of as a mental experience could interact with or influence any physical state, such as the movement of a limb or the forming of a word. This set of age old problems has not received any successful or generally received solution. (Kim, 1998) Second, psychological states such as thoughts, beliefs or wishes have the property of intention: they refer to things, frequently objects outside the person whose thoughts, etc. they are. But how can one material thing – a brain state – refer to another material thing – the object outside? The brain state is merely, we imagine, an inscription; we might as well try to imagine a scratch, or a mark on paper, as referring. (Putnam, 1981) Perhaps the brain state refers because of a complex causal chain which has linked that state to previous encounters with the referred-to object. (Putnam, 1975) But this, too, is difficult to imagine. Suppose that science allowed us to establish that, after a number of exposures to an object, a correlation is set up between the appearance of that object and a pattern of brain activity. And now suppose that that brain pattern were stimulated, for example by an implanted electrode. Is it possible, whatever my ensuing psychological state, that when that brain activity occurred I meant that object? Suppose I said, “A” (the name of A): would I be meaning A? It seems clear that we would not say this: whether I meant A would depend on much else (for example, whether A was present, whether I responded to it in certain ways, whether I handled certain related concepts ‘appropriately’). Only if all these other things were true could we say that, when the appropriate brain activity is stimulated, that I meant A. And therefore, only if all these other requirements were met could we claim that the appropriate causal chain had established the object –
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Personen. Ein Interdisziplinärer D
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Persons. An Interdisciplinary Appro
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Inhalt / Contents Names That Name N
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Inhalt / Contents Das Ideal, ein gu
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3. Objections & Replies In this sec
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Strawson´s Concept of Person - A C
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5. Summary Strawson´s Concept Of P
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Some Reflections about Wittgenstein
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Von Lebensform oder Lebensformen zu
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Von Lebensform oder Lebensformen zu
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Although history plays an important
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Person und Zeit. Eine Auseinanderse
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On the Austere Conception of Nonsen
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about the status of particular rema
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Personen als Handelnde - Ein Proble
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Personal Identity, Numerical and Qu
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Construction, Convention, and Subje
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Different Kinds of Naturalistic Exp
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Different Kinds of Naturalistic Exp
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Charakterisierung der Person in den
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Gegenständen. Die Identität wird
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Criticism, Context and Community: C
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Freiheit, Personen und ontologische
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Freiheit, Personen und ontologische
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Social Externalism and Psychologica
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An Epistemic Component to Personal
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An Epistemic Component to Personal
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ule is the form of life in which it
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der inneren Wahrnehmung verlegt: di
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Mental Simulation: the Old-Fashione
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to work or not, and hence I am unju
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Three Applications of an Austin/Wit
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Die Konstituenten der Person: Eichu
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Die Konstituenten der Person: Eichu
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Referential Relation in Wittgenstei
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Are Persons Members of a Natural Ki
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Considering persons as nominal kind
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egun to cringe over the rapid incre
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terminology, as subjects). Although
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Haben juristische Personen Persönl
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Auch Decknamen sind vom Namensschut
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more as an activity like energy rat
Page 86 and 87: Wittgenstein: “Alpha, don’t be
Page 88 and 89: Sehen wir geschlechtlich verschiede
Page 90 and 91: Sehen wir geschlechtlich verschiede
Page 92 and 93: the former but not in the latter. A
Page 94 and 95: schizophrenics had much bigger diff
Page 96 and 97: 3. Is self-knowledge knowledge? (a)
Page 98 and 99: ”Beam me up, Scotty! - Teleportat
Page 100 and 101: ”Beam me up, Scotty! - Teleportat
Page 102 and 103: Gendler on Why We Can't Trust Thoug
Page 104 and 105: Why is the Notion of Person also De
Page 106 and 107: Why is the Notion of Person also De
Page 108 and 109: korrekten "Ideologie" in die analyt
Page 110 and 111: Persons, Agents, and the End-of-lif
Page 112 and 113: (Hayward (1994) calls this "the pat
Page 114 and 115: Figures 1 presents performance chan
Page 116 and 117: Das Theorem der „Locked-in-Person
Page 118 and 119: Eine Lösung für dieses Problem k
Page 120 and 121: "Keine Fachprüfung in Menschenkenn
Page 122 and 123: Lonergan on Person as Psychological
Page 124 and 125: einstating the beneficent progress
Page 126 and 127: While there´s no memory, no intent
Page 128 and 129: Strong Evaluations and Personal Ide
Page 130 and 131: References Flanagan, O. 1996 Self-E
Page 132 and 133: probably answer: I took this shilli
Page 134 and 135: Cartesian Minds Yakir Levin, Beer-S
Page 138 and 139: Are There Philosophical Answers to
Page 140 and 141: References Are There Philosophical
Page 142 and 143: Die juristische Person im Internati
Page 144 and 145: Literatur Aktiengesetz vom 31.03.19
Page 146 and 147: meisten, vielleicht sogar allen and
Page 148 and 149: mit den Methoden der Naturwissensch
Page 150 and 151: Zur Konstitution von Personen durch
Page 152 and 153: Wittgensteins Paradox des interkult
Page 154 and 155: Wittgensteins Paradox des interkult
Page 156 and 157: Der Personbegriff der ordinary lang
Page 158 and 159: Modaltheorie 2 (Bewußtsein): Perso
Page 160 and 161: First-Person Knowledge: Wittgenstei
Page 162 and 163: References First-Person Knowledge:
Page 164 and 165: The Join Philosophical Program of R
Page 166 and 167: Is the Private Language Argument a
Page 168 and 169: References Is the Private Language
Page 170 and 171: circumstances and not to actual hum
Page 172 and 173: The Notion of Person: a Reappraisal
Page 174 and 175: Language Idling and Language in Use
Page 176 and 177: Language Idling and Language in Use
Page 178 and 179: Zum Primat der juristischen Person
Page 180 and 181: »I can’t have your pains« First
Page 182 and 183: »I can’t have your pains« First
Page 184 and 185: genus (S) and a differentia (C) may
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Measuring the Uncertain - Remarks o
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Metaphysical Disputes Matjaž Potr
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Das Ideal, ein guter Mensch zu sein
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Das Ideal, ein guter Mensch zu sein
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conceptual framework (theory) in wh
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Has Nelkin Discovered Anything abou
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ules out relativism in Wittgenstein
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The Gap between 5.641 and 6 Logik u
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The gap between 5.641 and 6 - Logik
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argument [A1] to justify [CW]: Acco
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Die Rolle der Körperlichkeit im ge
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Die Rolle der Körperlichkeit im ge
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Understanding Everyday Mental Conce
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Good, Self, and Unselfing - Reflect
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References Good, Self, and Unselfin
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(ii) Wittgenstein also introduces a
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Has the Mind-Body Problem Advanced
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Affectivity and Identity in the Tre
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Framing-Ansätze und die Standardth
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eflexiver Entscheidungsprozesse wir
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Wittgenstein und die Flugtechnik Mo
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vom 26.2.1918 auf Wittgensteins neu
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understanding of “world” this d
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Assertion as a Language-Game: the R
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Assertion as a Language-Game: the R
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Geheime Beobachtung und der Respekt
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Spuren Tolstois in Wittgensteins Ta
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Spuren Tolstois in Wittgensteins Ta
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Erinnerte Zeit und Zeit der Erinner
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Erinnerte Zeit und Zeit der Erinner
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Wittgenstein on Personal Time Mauri
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“There is what we say there is,
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Normativity, Autonomy and Pluralism
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Conceptual Analysis, Theory Constru
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Conceptual Analysis, Theory Constru
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dem Hintergrund des Cartesischen Du
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Is Determinism with regard to the S
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Is Determinism with regard to the S
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Tractatus logico-graphicus. Eine Ph
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Wittgenstein's Contributions to Phi
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References Edwards, J. C. 1985 Ethi
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one has to look for something more
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Evolving Persons and Free Will Rüd
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References Barton, R. A. and Dunbar
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4. Turning away from the linguistic
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Multiple Realizability and Property
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Multiple Realizability and Property
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Aesthetic Aspects on Persons in Kan
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The 4 th Dimension - Wittgenstein o
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Menschen im Wachkoma: Personen oder
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intrinsischem Wert (vgl. Verlautbar
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