Made in Germany : the German currency crisis of July 1931

ecoming scarce even for key currency countries. In both Britain and France interest
group pressures to give pride of place in economic policymaking to overseas territories
and the empire ("imperial preference") were visibly growing. Such plans, if brought to
fruition, would gravely threaten Germany and might effectively terminate its hopes of
running export surpluses. In this context, a policy of Drang nach Osten looked like
simple common sense to growing numbers of German firms, including several giants,
such as I.G. Farben (which had close ties to the cabinet and political circles around the
Chancellor), Siemens, and Krupp. In the eyes of many, this strategy increasingly emerged
as an alternative, not a complement, to traditional internationalist economic policies, not
least because some sort of exclusive tariff concession would be needed to ensure
Germany's primacy in these areas. 61
The plans for what became the notorious proposal for a customs union between
Germany and Austria did not originate with the Reichstag or other normal policy making
channels. Instead, the scheme emerged from a secret planning committee convened by the
aristocratic German Foreign Office, which had for years met regularly with leading
German firms and enjoyed close ties to the military. While Briining and the Foreign
Minister (the project's public champion, whose reappointment had been confirmed by
President Hindenberg) knew of the proposal, the cabinet was not told until the last
minute. Advised by Briining that the timing was unfortunate but that Germany could not
control this, the cabinet voted approval on March 18, making it public on March 21. 62
Ever since the end of World War I, the specter of Anschluss between Germany
and Austria had alternately tantalized or repelled many Europeans. While the Treaty of
Versailles barred barred Germany from incorporating Austria, the German government's
29