NEW PLAYERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - German Marshall ...

Executive Summary
The number of new states seeking some
combination of economic, energy, and security
gains in the Mediterranean is increasing. Some
have historical ties with the Mediterranean
region and the Maghreb and are trying to build
or rebuild economic and security ties. Others
probably see the Mediterranean region through
both short- and longer-term filters that reveal more
immediate economic interests but that eventually
converge with a larger strategic plan. Still others
see purely economic benefits, and a few see purely
security benefits.
The emerging strategic landscape in the
Mediterranean is being constantly shaped by the
entry of new players—China, India, Brazil—with
strategies that reflect their special economic and
security concerns and the re-entry of some old
ones—e.g., Russia—with strategies that remind
us of pre-Cold War objectives. The landscape is
changing rapidly, the dynamics of the individual
actors and of their possible combinations are fluid,
and the trajectories of their strategies are far from
clear. It is of course impossible to know everyone’s
motivation, but it is possible to identify a number
of emerging issues and patterns of behavior with
some confidence.
Russia is reasserting its global role, and its activities
in the Mediterranean are part of a larger strategy
shaped by a fluid interplay of internal and external
influences. In this it draws on a deep historical
involvement in the region, impaired at least
temporarily by the breakdown of Soviet power.
Russia has many cards to play, and it is playing
some of them expertly.
China once enjoyed ties with the countries of
the Mediterranean and the Maghreb mainly as
an extension of the Silk Road. It has returned to
the Mediterranean theater through aggressive
investment in strategic infrastructure and energy,
although its investment in Europe proper has been
minimal. It also is possible to see China’s interest in
the region as part of a grand strategy that extends
Beijing’s footprint globally.
India’s historical ties to the Mediterranean date
back more than 1,000 years. Its interests in the
Maghreb are linked to its interests in the broader
Arab world; its economic ties to both Italy and
Cyprus are particularly deep. Like China, India
is pursuing a multifaceted energy strategy in
which the Mediterranean figures with increasing
prominence, Libya being a particular target. India’s
Mediterranean strategy is also notable for the
close India-Israel security condominium, which
is important.
A range of other actors, Japan and Brazil
for example, add increasing fluidity to the
Mediterranean’s strategic dynamics and make for
the possibility of political-economic alignments and
realignments that may be unprecedented.
Six conclusions emerge from this analysis:
First, all of the key new players in the
Mediterranean view the acquisition of additional
supplies of energy from Mediterranean states as
both necessary and possible, and they are designing
strategies to this end. While supplies are abundant,
transport is unimpaired, and comity reigns amongst
them, the Mediterranean’s energy market will
likely work efficiently enough as part of a global
market that determines who gets how much and
at what price. But any hiccup in the larger global
energy supply system—or worse, if one can imagine
destabilizing political turmoil in Saudi Arabia or
the collapse of the Iranian theocracy—will bring a
heightened level of competition, probably including
military competition, among non-Mediterranean
states and actors in the Mediterranean region itself
to adjudicate how energy is produced, sold, and
transported. In this sense, the Mediterranean basin
has become an important section of the energy
security umbilical cord linking Asia’s dynamic
economies to the global energy marketplace.
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