Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations - Federation of American ...

Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence
that the environment is growing more violent and that the “violent free for all” is a relatively new
development in Mexico. 90
Fragmentation that began in 2010 and accelerated in 2011 has redefined the “battlefield” and
brought new actors, such as Los Zetas and the Knights Templar, to the fore. An array of smaller
organizations are now active, including the Resistance and the Jalisco Cartel-New Generation,
who have reportedly competed for territory in the coastal states of Nayarit, Colima, and Jalisco. 91
Recently some analysts have identified Jalisco Cartel-New Generation as a “major” cartel.
Although this group split off from a wing of the Sinaloa DTO (it had been loyal to “El Nacho”
Coronel who was killed by Mexican authorities in July 2010), Jalisco Cartel-New Generation
now opposes some former allies of Sinaloa such as the Knights Templar as well as fighting
against its enemy, Los Zetas. 92
Contrary to the experience in Colombia with the sequential dismantling of the enormous Medellin
and Cali cartels, 93 fragmentation in Mexico has been associated with escalating violence. 94 A
“kingpin strategy” implemented by the Mexican government has “taken down” numerous topand
mid-level leaders in all the major DTOs, either through arrests or deaths in operations to
detain them. However, this strategy with political decentralization has contributed to violent
succession struggles, shifting alliances among the DTOs, a proliferation of new gangs and small
DTOs, and the replacement of existing leaders and criminal groups by ones who are even more
violent. 95 Analysts disagree about the extent of this fragmentation and its importance. Several
analysts have observed that as the Mexican DTOs have fragmented and multiplied, violence has
escalated to an all-time high. 96 Others analysts caution not to overstate the level of fragmentation.
Many of these organizations and smaller gangs are new and it is premature to predict how they
will fare or whether the resulting highly competitive group of smaller organizations will be easier
to dismantle. The Calderón government, on the other hand, asserted that the removal of DTO
leadership through government enforcement operations has not caused violence to spike. 97
90 Patrick Corcoran, “Mexico: Upstart Gangs Eat into Cartel Hegemony,” In Sight Crime: Organized Crime in the
Americas, August 4, 2011.
91 Patrick Corcoran, “Mexico: Upstart Gangs Eat into Cartel Hegemony,” In Sight Crime: Organized Crime in the
Americas, August 4, 2011.
92 See, Peña Nieto’s Challenge: Criminal Cartels and Rule of Law in Mexico, especially Appendix D: Main Cartels in
Mexico. See also, STRATFOR, “Mexico Security Memo: The Death of a Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion Ally,”
February 27, 2013; STRATFOR, “Mexican Cartels: Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion,” April 4, 2013; Patrick
Corcoran, “Jalisco Cartel Promises Mexico Govt It Will Take Down Rival Gang,” In Sight Crime: Organized Crime in
the Americas, March 23, 2013.
93 In Colombia’s case, successfully targeting the huge and wealthy Medellín and Cali cartels and dismantling them
meant that a number of smaller drug trafficking organizations replaced them (“cartelitos”). The smaller organizations
have not been as violent and thus the government was seen to have reduced violence in the drug trade. Critical,
however, were factors in Colombia that were not present in Mexico, such as the presence of guerilla insurgents and
paramilitaries who became deeply involved in the illegal drug business. Some have argued that the Colombian cartels
of the 1980s and 1990s were structured and managed very differently than their contemporary counterparts in Mexico.
(See Appendix).
94 O’Neil, “Drug Fragmentation and Violence.”
95 STRATFOR, “Mexico’s Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date,” December 20, 2010; STRATFOR, “Mexican Drug
Wars Update: Targeting the Most Violent Cartels,” July 21, 2011.
96 O’Neil, “Drug Cartel Fragmentation and Violence;” Eduardo Guerrero Guitiérez, “La Raiz de La Violencia,” Nexos
en Línea, June 1, 2011. Guerrero also argues that eliminating leaders has dispersed the violence.
97 See Alejandro Poiré and Maria Teresa Martinez, “La Caida de los Capos No Muliplica la Violencia: El Caso de
Nacho Coronel,” Nexos en Linea, May 1, 2011. (Alejandro Poiré and Maria Teresa Martinez were officials from the
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