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successful interface risk management - International Rail Safety ...

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Axel Kappeler, James Catmur<br />

Arthur D. Little<br />

Successful <strong>interface</strong> <strong>risk</strong> <strong>management</strong> – from blame culture to joint action<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

Interfaces are important because they are everywhere. However, current approaches for managing safety<br />

<strong>risk</strong>s at <strong>interface</strong>s often only consider technical aspects and whilst some include considerations of manmachine<br />

<strong>interface</strong>s few consider non-technical (e.g. organisational) <strong>interface</strong>s.<br />

This paper proposes a new approach to systematically identifying, assessing and managing non-technical<br />

<strong>interface</strong> <strong>risk</strong>s. The emphasis of the approach is on bringing both parties together to work jointly to manage<br />

the <strong>interface</strong> <strong>risk</strong>s. As a result there is a far better understanding and agreement on:<br />

1. What the <strong>interface</strong> is.<br />

2. What the <strong>risk</strong>s at the <strong>interface</strong> are.<br />

3. How big the <strong>risk</strong>s are.<br />

4. What actions need to be taken by each party to manage each <strong>risk</strong>.<br />

Core to the approach used for identifying <strong>interface</strong> <strong>risk</strong>s is a HAZOP style assessment using Guidewords.<br />

HAZOP is an especially powerful technique for analysing <strong>interface</strong>s. The paper also proposes a framework<br />

for managing the identified <strong>risk</strong>s to make sure they actually reduce <strong>risk</strong> – an area often overlooked or<br />

conducted poorly in many organisations.<br />

The approach outlined in this paper has been applied <strong>successful</strong>ly by a number of clients in the UK and<br />

abroad including a high speed rail project, the Highways Agency and a multinational manufacturing<br />

company.<br />

REFERENCES<br />

[1] http://oxforddictionaries.com/<br />

[2] Department of Defence standard practice system safety, MIL-STD-882E, 11 May 2012<br />

[3] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, RTO technical report TR-IST-027, Validation, verification and<br />

certification, of embedded systems, published October 2005<br />

[4] Commission Regulation (EC) No 352/2009 of 24 April 2009 on the adoption of a common safety<br />

method on <strong>risk</strong> evaluation and assessment as referred to in Article 6(3)(a) of Directive 2004/49/EC of<br />

the European Parliament and of the Council<br />

[5] NASA Risk <strong>management</strong> handbook pre-decisional first draft, NASA/SP-2011-XXX, Version 1.0, XXXXX<br />

2011<br />

[6] Catmur J, Chudleigh M, Redmill F, System safety: HAZOP and software HAZOP (Hardback, 1999)<br />

[7] Kletz T, Hazop and Hazan – Identifying and assessing process industry hazards, 4 th edition, IChemE,<br />

1999<br />

[8] Chemical Industries Association, A guide to hazard and operability studies, 1990<br />

[9] Kletz T, Hazop and Hazan, Notes on the identification and assessment of hazards, loss prevention, The<br />

Institution of Chemical Engineers Information Exchange Scheme, Hazard workshop modules<br />

London, 8 – 10 October 2012

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