In Re Streckrich Petro Corporation, 08-31860 - Eastern District of ...
In Re Streckrich Petro Corporation, 08-31860 - Eastern District of ...
In Re Streckrich Petro Corporation, 08-31860 - Eastern District of ...
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truly believed that the Agreement was a loan agreement, one would expect that it<br />
would list Royall on Schedule D as a creditor holding a secured claim. It did not do so.<br />
Rather, it listed the Agreement on Schedule G as a “Property Lease dated March 11,<br />
20<strong>08</strong> on non-residential real property located in Missouri.” (Docket No. 10, Schedule<br />
G.) Schedule G requires a debtor to describe all “unexpired leases <strong>of</strong> real or personal<br />
property.” SPC itself, therefore, characterized the Agreement as a lease agreement as<br />
late as November 13, 20<strong>08</strong> when it filed its bankruptcy schedules. 5<br />
<strong>In</strong> addition, the Agreement states that the parties “agree and acknowledge that<br />
this transaction is not intended as a security arrangement or financing secured by real<br />
property, but shall be construed for all purposes as a true lease.” (Ex. 5 at § 23.18.)<br />
While the form <strong>of</strong> the agreement does not control, this section specifically states that<br />
the parties intended for the Agreement to be a lease agreement and not a financing or<br />
security agreement. This, and the fact that SPC characterized the Agreement as a<br />
lease as late as November 13, 20<strong>08</strong>, provides persuasive support for the conclusion that<br />
the parties intended the Agreement to be a lease.<br />
ii.<br />
Many other provisions in the Agreement demonstrate that<br />
it is a lease agreement.<br />
The Agreement contains a number <strong>of</strong> other provisions that are similar to true<br />
lease provisions, including provisions permitting Royall the right to enter the<br />
5 <strong>In</strong> addition, in its motion for an order extending the exclusivity period for<br />
filing a plan <strong>of</strong> reorganization and to solicit acceptances there<strong>of</strong>, SPC stated that it<br />
was a holding company with an interest in a “Lease Agreement,” and that it was<br />
the tenant and Royall was the Landlord in that lease agreement. (Docket No. 26 at<br />
2.)<br />
20