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continue to not only define these processes in more detail but also to develop methods to<br />

build, sustain, and evaluate the processes.<br />

This report is not a “how to guide.” It is a vehicle to present the initial work we have done<br />

toward the development of the “roadmap” previously discussed. Organizations looking for<br />

assistance in building or improving incident management capabilities should look to our<br />

other publications and available training as outlined at our main web site for CSIRT Development,<br />

http://www.cert.org/csirts/.<br />

Much of our initial work to date has been within the CSIRT community. This report, although<br />

applicable to broader incident management processes, is written from a CSIRT perspective. It<br />

approaches the process definitions from a CSIRT point of view, often addressing how CSIRTs<br />

fit into the overall incident management framework in their parent organizations or constituencies<br />

(hence the title of the report). However, many organizations do not have entities that<br />

they call CSIRTs; they have some other organizational structure or processes to handle this<br />

work. This report is still applicable to those organizations. It is useful outside of the CSIRT<br />

community and can be applied in any organization that deals with the handling and prevention<br />

of computer security incidents.<br />

It should be pointed out, however, that the initial set of processes included here are more appropriate<br />

for internal incident management or CSIRT capabilities, as defined in our report<br />

Organizational Models for CSIRTs [Killcrece 03a]. An internal capability is one in which<br />

staff in the organization have been assigned the responsibility for incident management and<br />

the constituency being serviced is the parent organization. Future work will include applying<br />

these processes to other organizational models, particularly the Coordinating CSIRT model.<br />

The terminology and variety of organizational structures involved in incident management<br />

today can often be confusing. We will begin to explore some of these areas of confusion in<br />

the material presented here. We will look at the difference and relationship between CSIRTs<br />

and incident management capabilities; we will also look at the difference and interrelationship<br />

between incident management and security management functions.<br />

The material in this report is based on the information we have collected through our own<br />

experiences, discussions with and observations of other CSIRTs and incident management<br />

organizations, research and review of existing publications and literature related to CSIRTs<br />

and incident response, and from experience with risk analysis and process methodologies. We<br />

are very interested in receiving comments about this work from the CSIRT community. If you<br />

would like to share your opinions or suggest additions to this report, please contact us by<br />

sending email to csirt-info@cert.org.<br />

CMU/SEI-2004-TR-015<br />

xi

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