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Tobias Auberger and Tanja Hitzel-Cassagnes - Mzes

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13<br />

Weiss 2005, Dangerfield 2006, Barani 2006). On the other side, in anticipating the joining<br />

of the European Union the c<strong>and</strong>idate countries started to reform their legal systems <strong>and</strong><br />

made first efforts to “Europeanise” their legal codes in order to prepare enlargement – esp.<br />

after they became obliged to “gradually” harmonise their national legal systems (see Kühn<br />

2005). On the one h<strong>and</strong>, this process led to various negotiations about specific transitional<br />

measures <strong>and</strong>, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, it influenced the efforts of constitutional <strong>and</strong> institutional<br />

reforms insofar as the inclusion of the c<strong>and</strong>idate countries was ameliorated <strong>and</strong> their concerns<br />

were taken more seriously into consideration. However, it might be – inspired by an<br />

ex-post-facto evaluation of this situation – exactly this experience of just being allowed to<br />

articulate one’s own stance without being systematically <strong>and</strong> formally empowered to participate,<br />

that nurtured anxieties about a potential asymmetric functioning of the European<br />

Union with regard to the new Member States after enlargement.<br />

If we have a look at these concerns, different levels of political <strong>and</strong> legal integration have to<br />

be regarded, in the first place distinctively the formal <strong>and</strong> the informal level of the<br />

European Union’s functioning. Regarding the formal level of changing the institutional<br />

composition <strong>and</strong> the decision-making <strong>and</strong> voting rules in the treaties the readings are rather<br />

optimistic insofar as the formal adjustments are appraised to enable an equal participation<br />

<strong>and</strong> cooperation between old <strong>and</strong> new member states (see Bertea 2005, Dangerfield 2006,<br />

Ellison 2005, Osajda 2006). However, this is only one side of the medal – especially acknowledging<br />

the Unions rather informal <strong>and</strong> sub-institutional mode of functioning in<br />

policy-formation <strong>and</strong> law-making – the informal level is quite crucial in twofold distinct<br />

areas. Firstly, considering the inter- <strong>and</strong> intra-institutional will-formation, far more than<br />

procedural cornerstone-rules matter; decisive in this respect are the informal techniques <strong>and</strong><br />

practices of cooperation, deliberation <strong>and</strong> bargaining, so that decision-making processes are<br />

highly a result of a complex web of negotiating games between institutional (<strong>and</strong> non-institutional)<br />

actors, also relying on settled forms of coalition- <strong>and</strong> block-building. Apart from<br />

worries about the decision-making efficiency in general (esp. in the Council <strong>and</strong> the Commission)<br />

worries about the cooperative scheme <strong>and</strong> the equal footing of the new actors<br />

within these games were articulated. Now again, this situation might be interpreted as of<br />

just being a question of (elite) socialisation in order to adapt the traditional “rules of the<br />

game” <strong>and</strong> fit in smoothly. Yet, it might also be a starting point to sensitise for potential

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