COLD WAR POLITICS OF SUPERPOWERS IN SOUTH ASIA Abstract

Bangladesh, but only to save West Pakistan’s anticipated disintegration. 34 The
US conveyed to the Soviets that if they were not going to restrain India, the
US might have to undertake tougher action. 35
It was clear that, practically, the US was not involved in South Asia until the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In general, the United States accepted
India as a regional power to assure peace and security in the region. In 1974,
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger acknowledged that “the size and position
of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asia and world affairs.” 36
It was hoped that, ultimately, Pakistan and Afghanistan would also come
under this collaboration. However, the Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974
and Pakistan’s intention to go nuclear forced the US administration to take
interest in the region to prevent nuclear proliferation. The Carter
administration took a strong stand against Pakistan’s nuclear development,
cutting off economic and military assistance. 37 However, the advent of the
Iranian revolution and the Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan fuelled the longstanding
Western fear of Soviet expansionism and gave an acute sense of
urgency to the need to retaliate and stop the advancement of the communists.
US regional and global interests compelled it to reestablish relations with
Pakistan, which had become a “front-line state” and the importance of
Pakistan can easily be understood from the Secretary of Defence’s statement
in March 1980:
Pakistan has become, through a combination of circumstances and
geography, a vital strategic area in the present contest between the
expansionist and non-expansionist power centers. Pakistan strategic
location can be a bridge between Southwest and Southeast Asia which is
physical barrier to the southward expansion of the Soviet Union and it
will be adequate counterweight to an expansionist Soviet. 38
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