UNClASSIFIED - The Black Vault

1 units in some critical facilities. However, 7AF indicated it was not an
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insurmountable problem and proposed the following actions;
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1) Conservation of F-100 sorties through the remainder of
the fiscal year to reduce operations and maintenance expenses.
2) Inform MACV of intent to employ a continuous stream
redeployment of the four F-100 squadrons beginning the first week in July.
(TS)(Gp-4)
approach to the F-100 problem.
Both CSAF and CINCPACAF concurred with 7AF's
In a 21 April message, .CSAF instructed 7AF
to discontinue further attempts to redeploy ·two F- 100 squadrons 'during
Increment VII and to concentrate on insuring that all four squadrons would
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:l be redeployed early in July.
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later 7AF received a message from CINCPACAF
citing the CSAF message' and agreeing that in view of MACV's finn decision
on the F: ~~~~ : ~~ t would be fruitl.E:ss to Pu~~ ~~ .. _~~e matter J_urther.
Additionally, PACAF stated that it had no objection to the conservation
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.. 1 of F-lOO sorties. The matter was closed in favor of the MACV position
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when, on 23 April 1971, Major General Ernest C. Hardin, Jr., Vice Commander,
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7AF dispatched the following letter to the Oeputy Commander of MACV :
In accordance with your decision in letter dated
13 April 1971, we will include the 4/F-100
squadrons in the proposed Increment 8 redeployment
package. We intend to begin redeployment
on or about 10 July 1971, to coincide with tanker
avai1~bi1ity.
~ Except for the letter from General Clay to General
Abrams. most of the correspondence associated with the attempt for an
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