The Qur'an and War - Air Power Studies

y analysing the outcomes of the
mission, which ultimately resulted
in the tribal leaders seeking an
honourable peace, with the loss of
only two British lives. The use of
coercive air power in Waziristan, and
particularly against the Mashud tribe
has an uncanny contemporary echo
in the American Predator campaign
against Islamic militants in Pakistan.
A further historical analysis is offered
by Group Captain Al Byford who
marks the seventieth anniversary
of the expeditionary campaign that
was fought in Norway in the spring
and early summer of 1940 and brings
it right up to date. Although the
operation was eclipsed at the time
by the German victory in France and
the Battle of Britain, it is worthy of
independent study. The Luftwaffe
demonstrated, for the first time in
modern warfare, how all four air
power capabilities – control of the
air, intelligence and situational
awareness, air mobility and attack
– could be brought together to
influence a joint campaign decisively.
The RAF was much less successful,
primarily because it was neither
organised nor equipped to undertake
expeditionary warfare, but it still
contributed more to the campaign
than is generally acknowledged. In
particular, air operations around
Narvik act as a useful point of
comparison with the disastrous
experience in south-central Norway.
Considered analysis of Norway 1940
highlights many lessons that are still
of real contemporary relevance; in
particular, the critical importance of
control of the air in enabling all other
activities; the psychological impact of
air power; and air power’s potential
as a force multiplier providing
mobility and firepower to small
bodies of troops in extremely difficult
terrain. But the limits of the air
weapon were also evident, especially
its dependence on force protection
and secure basing in a campaign
that was dominated by range and
distance, time and space, and the
paucity of useable airfields.
This edition of Air Power Review
contains two viewpoints, one
by Flight Lieutenant Alexander
McKenzie and the second by
Professor Philip Sabin. Alexander
McKenzie offers a view of operations
in Afghanistan using a historical
perspective and warns against
the folly of transposing successes
in one theatre to the challenges
of another. The article discusses
the complexity of the current
operational environment, the
difficulties of conducting effective
COIN operations in a 21 st Century
world and the contribution that air
power can make to such operations.
The viewpoint offered by Professor
Sabin, an earlier version of which