New Zealand in the Asian Century: Peace and Prosperity - Asia New ...

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Europe Meeting (ASEM), to which we both now belong, reflects a similar impetus from Europe. There is another grouping which links Asia and Latin America. Many of these groupings are aspirational, but they manifest an important point, that today’s regionalism by and large is open, not closed. This is excellent news for New Zealand. We are regionalism’s outsiders and stand to suffer if any part of the world turns in on itself. It is also a reflection of the more banal point, that so many issues in the 21 st century, whether climate change or human trafficking, can only be resolved globally, not regionally. The other conclusion to draw is that we do not have the Asia-Pacific region to ourselves. I was much struck by a reference in the Asian century white paper that a minister of education in Sweden suggested a year or two back that all Swedish school students should learn Chinese – in addition, of course to Swedish, English and French or Spanish. We are not the only developed countries seeking to ride the wave of Asian prosperity. But the messages are largely positive. And beyond that, we have goods, services, environments, ways of living which increasing numbers of our neighbours to the north find attractive and wish to enjoy. We are innovative and creative. Our societies are, again by and large, open and welcoming to peoples from all over the world, whether as tourists, students, investors or immigrants. The English language and the transparent and accountable rule of law are huge and important assets. The diversity of the principal cities of Australasia is probably almost unprecedented, and yet our social cohesion remains strong. As I indicated earlier, when we turn to the geopolitical order, we are faced with a different set of circumstances. I’m an historian by inclination so forgive me if I turn the clock back at this point, but not too far back, really only the length of my lifetime, and that I suspect of most people in this room. Despite what happened in Singapore in 1942, we emerged as amongst the groups of victors in World War II. The aftermath of that war, if not quite a restoration on the scale of the Congress of Vienna, did represent a return for us rather than a new beginning. It was the exact opposite for most of our northern neighbours. Independence for India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Indonesia, a new and divisive beginning for China, rehabilitation for Japan, partition of Korea – all of these took place in the first six years after the end of World War II. These are ancient civilisations but new states. In comparison, although we may not think of it much like that, while our societies are new, politically we are old. The New Zealand Parliament first met in 1854 and has had an uninterrupted history ever since. It is thus not surprising that some of the perspectives that we have differ from Asia and that this can represent a policy challenge. When we were writing our 2010 defence white paper, some parts were relatively easy. We knew what to say about the national defence of New Zealand – it did not differ from what we had said in many previous similar documents over several decades. We could not identify any direct threat to New Zealand’s sovereignty but there were a variety of ways in which encroachments could take place, such as in our maritime domain or through cyber space. The capabilities, military and other, we needed to deal with these are more of the same.
We also had clear precedents for how New Zealand contributed to international forces in far-flung parts of the world. We had been doing that for most of the 20 th century, and could readily forecast that there would be further such calls on our highly professional armed forces in the decades to come, even if we could not pinpoint when or where. There was also plenty of precedent for how we would support our South Pacific neighbours. The interventions in Timor in 1999, Solomons in 2004 and Tonga in 2006 gave us ample material and – more than just by the way – some confidence from recent developments that such interventions can be successful. But the larger Asia-Pacific region was more of a conundrum. This is a region of immense importance to New Zealand, as I have already outlined, increasingly the major source of our wealth and prosperity. Yet it would be drawing a very long bow to suggest that what was happening in the region represented a direct threat to New Zealand. This simply would not be credible to our people. Equally the Asia of today is not a theatre in which there would be much call for New Zealand forces to engage in the expeditionary assistance that has been such a strong feature of our military history (and yours), including in Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. Asia is now a region of strong states, not weak states, states which are more than able to look after their internal and in most cases external security, states which are using their economic wealth to reposition themselves in the region and the world. Yet at the same time we did not, and decided we should not, stand aside from the security challenges of the region. Quite apart from our continuing relationship through the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) with Malaysia and Singapore, we had a very direct interest in a region which was not only prosperous but also peaceful and stable. This is not just because an unstable region would disrupt trade flows and thus affect our economic wellbeing, although that is important. At a more fundamental level, tension and conflict challenge the very premises on which our world operates, they are symptoms of illness in the global body politic. We cannot ignore them. As a responsible member of the regional and international community of states, we see ourselves as under an obligation to sustain a stable and peaceful state of affairs. Are peace and stability threatened? Maybe not as such but I would identify at least two risks: The growth of China, India and the other countries of Asia is affecting the balance of power in our region, and globally. There has been much analysis, some of the most trenchant coming from Australia, of whether such shifts can be peaceful, or almost always end in conflict, or simply in themselves presage a prolonged period of instability and uncertainty. Specifically this then turns on the role and position of the United States, as the incumbent power, and of China as the strongest of the rising powers. Second, within the region, there are a number of unresolved issues of sovereignty. The islands and places may not be important in themselves (although some are) but they can readily become proxies for national rivalry. There are risks flowing from divergent interpretations of the rules of the road (or of the high seas in this instance), or from the behaviour of trigger happy local actors. If those are the risks, what can New Zealand, or Australia for that matter, do to mitigate them?
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