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Pratityasamutpada in Eastern and Western Modes of Thought ...

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construction <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d. Niels Bohr once put it like this: ‘There is no world <strong>of</strong> quantum,<br />

there is only a quantum mechanical description.’” 11<br />

Nagarjuna presents these four extreme views <strong>of</strong> reality <strong>in</strong> a scheme that is called<br />

<strong>in</strong> Sanskrit: ‘catuskoti’ <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Greek: ‘tetralemma’. In a short form, they can be expressed<br />

as follows: Th<strong>in</strong>gs do not arise substantially: 1. either out <strong>of</strong> themselves, 2. nor out <strong>of</strong><br />

someth<strong>in</strong>g else, 3. nor out <strong>of</strong> both, 4. nor without a cause. Beh<strong>in</strong>d this scheme there are,<br />

as mentioned before, four views <strong>of</strong> reality that can be related to substantial, subjective,<br />

holistic, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>strumentalist modes <strong>of</strong> thought <strong>in</strong> the modern world. It would be difficult<br />

to f<strong>in</strong>d a modern person who does not, <strong>in</strong> his own way, hold one <strong>of</strong> these four extreme<br />

views. This shows that Nagarjuna’s philosophy is very up-to-date. Nagarjuna did not<br />

refute 1. the substantial modes <strong>of</strong> thought <strong>in</strong> order to end up <strong>in</strong> 2. subjectivism, even<br />

though this is <strong>of</strong>ten claimed aga<strong>in</strong>st him; nor did he refute the ‘either or’ mode <strong>of</strong> thought<br />

<strong>in</strong> order to end with a view <strong>of</strong> 3. holism, identity, or wholeness, which some benevolent<br />

<strong>in</strong>terpreters say <strong>of</strong> him; nor did he refute holism <strong>in</strong> order to end up with 4.<br />

<strong>in</strong>strumentalism, as is believed by many modern <strong>in</strong>terpreters <strong>in</strong> imitation <strong>of</strong> the<br />

philosopher Ludwig Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>. Nagarjuna does not fall <strong>in</strong>to any <strong>of</strong> these extremes<br />

because they are the exact four extreme metaphysical views that he systematically refutes.<br />

Already <strong>in</strong> the very first verse <strong>of</strong> the MMK, he po<strong>in</strong>ts out not only the dilemma<br />

but the whole tetralemma <strong>of</strong> our th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. That verse states: “Neither from itself nor from<br />

another, nor from both, nor without a cause, does anyth<strong>in</strong>g whatever anywhere arise.” 12<br />

This verse can be understood as the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal statement <strong>of</strong> the Mulamadhyamaka-karika<br />

(MMK): The refutation <strong>of</strong> the four extreme metaphysical views, that cannot be reconciled<br />

with the dependent aris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs. If this is the case, the rema<strong>in</strong>der <strong>of</strong> the MMK would<br />

be merely a clarification <strong>of</strong> this first verse. Therefore this requires careful exam<strong>in</strong>ation.<br />

What is the assertion made by this verse? That noth<strong>in</strong>g can be found, that there is noth<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

that noth<strong>in</strong>g exists? Was Nagarjuna deny<strong>in</strong>g the external world? Did he wish to refute<br />

that which evidently is? Did he want to call <strong>in</strong>to question the world <strong>in</strong> which we live? Did<br />

he wish to deny the presence everywhere <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs that somehow arise? If by ‘arise’ we<br />

underst<strong>and</strong> the notion <strong>of</strong> the empirical aris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs then we are obliged to argue that<br />

if a th<strong>in</strong>g does not arise out <strong>of</strong> itself, it must arise out <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g else. So we should ask:<br />

what is the significance <strong>of</strong> the notion ‘to arise’?<br />

In another text, Nagarjuna himself gives some <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>of</strong> how to underst<strong>and</strong><br />

this view. He writes <strong>in</strong> his work Yuktisastika (YS):<br />

19. That which has arisen dependently on this <strong>and</strong> that that has not arisen<br />

substantially (svabhavatah). What has not arisen substantially, how can it literally<br />

(nama) be called ‘arisen’? …That which orig<strong>in</strong>ates due to a cause <strong>and</strong> does not<br />

abide without (certa<strong>in</strong>) conditions but disappears when the conditions are absent,<br />

how can it be understood as ‘to exist’? 13<br />

11 Zeil<strong>in</strong>ger, Anton. Interview <strong>in</strong> the German newspaper Tagesspiegel 20 December 1999 (my own translation). Steven<br />

Hawk<strong>in</strong>gs is defend<strong>in</strong>g a very similar position. He says: “I, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, am a positivist who believes that physical<br />

theories are just mathematical models we construct, <strong>and</strong> that it is mean<strong>in</strong>gless to ask if they correspond to reality, just<br />

whether they predict observations” (“The Objections <strong>of</strong> an Unashamed Reductionist.” In: Penrose, Roger. The Large,<br />

the Small <strong>and</strong> the Human M<strong>in</strong>d, Cambridge University Press. 2000. p. 169). It is not mean<strong>in</strong>gless to ask about the<br />

correspondence between a model <strong>and</strong> object, because if a model is correct then it has structural similarities with the<br />

phenomena that it is reconstruct<strong>in</strong>g; otherwise it can lead to predictions for which there are no mean<strong>in</strong>gful physical<br />

explanation, because they have no correspondence to experimental data.<br />

12 Garfield, Jay L. The fundamental wisdom <strong>of</strong> the middle way: Nagarjuna’s ‘Mulamadhyamakakarika’ (MMK). New<br />

York: Oxford University Press. 1996. p. 3.<br />

13 See: L<strong>in</strong>dtner, Christian. op.cit., pp. 109, 113.

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