UID For Dummies (PDF) - Countercurrents.org

Though the information gathered by the NIAI may be shared with other agencies with the
consent of the UID number holder, in this bill, the safeguards for protection of privacy of
individuals are weak. Under Clause 33 (b), the NIAI is required to disclose identity
information in the interest of national security, if so directed by an authorised officer of the
rank of Joint Secretary or above in the central government. The safeguard for protection of
privacy differ from the Supreme Court guidelines on telephone tapping; these permit phone
tapping under threat of “public emergency” for a period of six months, while information
gathered by UID can be shared in the interest of national security, offering no review
mechanism.
This leaves space for profiling and surveillance of individuals by intelligence agencies, as
nothing in the bill prevents them from using the UID to “link” various databases (such as
telephone records, air travel records, etc.). This kind of a system could lead to persecution of
innocent individuals who may get tagged falsely as potential threats.
As far as “Offences and Penalties” are concerned in this bill, it holds that no court shall
acknowledge any offence except on a complaint made by the NIAI. This effectively exempts
NIAI of any public accountability. This heavy concentration of power in a single authority is
alarming and raises grave doubts about just how transparent this system really is.
Q. 23. How does UID impact privacy concerns in India?
Internationally, there is growing concern about privacy and its protection. In India, however,
paying lip service to this issue once in a while is as good as it gets. (Although in May 2000,
the Indian government passed the Information Technology Act, a set of regulations meant to
provide a comprehensive regulatory environment for electronic commerce).
Despite all assurances about protection of sensitive information on mass scale, it must be
acknowledged that any database that stocks up such personal information brings with it the
risk of misuse by various agencies be it public or private, impinging on an individual’s
privacy. Even UIDAI chief Nandan Nilekani has conceded, on record, that the country
needed well-defined privacy laws to prevent any malicious use of data. Regarding the
possibility of data being misused, he said that the only service provided by the UIDAI was
that of authentication.
In the NIAI Bill, there are sketchy descriptions of offences like “intentionally” accessing the
UID database and damaging, stealing, altering or disrupting the data. But it provides no
means for a person whose data is stored to know that such an offence has been committed;
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