Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care?

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182 KATIE MCSHANE 25 Notice that here I do not make the further claim that the attitudes of love, respect and awe involve seeing their objects as having value in their own right. For a discussion of this issue, see McShane 2007. 26 Rolston 1988: 25–6. 27 This might depend on how distinguish actions from feelings. If we count ʻadopting an attitude toward somethingʼ as an action, then the problems I raise here for feeling-norms will make trouble for some action-norms as well. 28 Or to see A as mattering, or to believe that A matters, or to judge that A matters – how one construes this will depend on oneʼs theory of the emotions in general, and the relevant emotion in particular. 29 An anonymous reviewer raises the following objection: ʻI think I am able to feel awe for some impressive piece of human engineering, say the Boulder Dam or the pyramids, while believing simultaneously that the Dam itself serves only an instrumental purpose and has no value other than that of providing energy for humans.ʼ In this case, the reviewer believes that while the Dam is awesome, its awesomeness makes no contribution at all to its value – it would be just as good if it was small, ordinary, not very well put together, designed by a few mediocre engineers, etc., just as long as it did its job of providing energy for humans. In this case, I am inclined to doubt that what the reviewer is feeling is really awe. Insofar as awe is a valuing attitude, it isnʼt just the thought ʻMy, what a large object!ʼ Itʼs valuing something in virtue of its greatness. But by hypothesis, this person thinks that its greatness isnʼt a reason to value it – the only aspect of it that merits valuation is its energy-producing abilities. 30 See Leopold 1970: 189–90. See also Sagoff 1991. 31 OʼConnell 1998: 81. 32 Duncan 1998: 45–9. 33 Abbey 1977: 12; Johnson 1998: 57; Hoagland 1999: 83; Duncan 1998. 34 Vickery 1994. 35 For discussions of respect and awe in particular, see Leopold 1970 and Naess 1973 on respect and Fowles 1983 and Muir 1987 on awe. REFERENCES Abbey, Edward. 1977. The Journey Home. New York: Penguin Books. Anderson, Elizabeth. 1993. Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Baier, Annette. 1995. Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Beardsley, Monroe C. 1965. ʻIntrinsic valueʼ, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26: 1–17. Bell, Michael. 2000. Sentimentalism, Ethics and the Culture of Feeling. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave. Brentano, Franz. 1969. The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Environmental Values 16.1
ANTHROPOCENTRISM VS. NONANTHROPOCENTRISM 183 Callicott, J. Baird. 1984. ʻNon-anthropocentric value theory and environmental ethicsʼ, American Philosophical Quarterly 21: 299–309. Callicott, J. Baird. 1985. ʻIntrinsic value, quantum theory, and environmental ethicsʼ, Environmental Ethics 7: 257–275. Callicott, J. Baird. 1989a. ʻThe conceptual foundations of the land ethicʼ, in J. Baird Callicott (ed.), In Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: State University of New York Press), pp. 75–99. Callicott, J. Baird. 1989b. In Defense of the Land Ethic. Albany: State University of New York Press. Callicott, J. Baird. 1992. ʻRolston on intrinsic value: a deconstructionʼ, Environmental Ethics 14: 129–143. Callicott, J. Baird. 1999. Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press. DʼArms, Justin, and Daniel Jacobson. 2000. ʻSentiment and valueʼ, Ethics 110: 722–748. Darwall, Stephen. 1995. The British Moralists and the Internal ʻOughtʼ: 1640–1740. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Donner, <strong>We</strong>ndy. 2002. ʻ Callicott on intrinsic value and moral standing in environmental ethicsʼ, in Wayne Ouderkirk and Jim Hill (eds.), Land, Value, Community: Callicott and Environmental Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press), pp. 99–105. Duncan, David James. 1998. ʻThe war for Normanʼs Riverʼ, Sierra 83(3): 45–9. Fowles, John. 1983. The Tree. New York: Ecco Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 1990. Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Goodpaster, K. E. 1979. ʻFrom egoism to environmentalismʼ, in K.E. Goodpaster and K.M. Sayre (eds.), Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press), pp. 21–35. Hayward, Tim. 1997. ʻ<strong>Anthropocentrism</strong>: a misunderstood problemʼ, Environmental Values 6: 49–63. Hoagland, Edward. 1999. ʻEarthʼs eyeʼ, Sierra 84: 60–65, 82, 83. Holland, Alan. 1996. ʻThe use and abuse of ecological concepts in environmental ethicsʼ, in N.S. Cooper and R.C.J. Carling (eds.), Ecologists and Ecological Judgments (New York: Chapman and Hall), pp. 27–41. Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Johnson, Trebbe. 1998. ʻThe second Creation story: redefining the bond between religion and ecologyʼ, Sierra 83: 53–7. Katz, Eric. 1999. ʻA pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrismʼ, Environmental Ethics 21: 377–390. Leopold, Aldo. 1970. A Sand County Almanac. With Essays on Conservation from Round River. New York: Ballantine Books. Light, Andrew. 2002. ʻContemporary environmental ethics: from metaethics to public philosophyʼ, Metaphilosophy 33(4): 426–449. Environmental Values 16.1
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Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care?

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