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Preparing to go public<br />
This transition relief also applies to<br />
any compensation received pursuant<br />
to the exercise of a stock option or<br />
substantial vesting of restricted stock<br />
granted under such a plan or agreement, so<br />
long as the grant occurred on or before the<br />
earliest of the specified events.<br />
Performance-based compensation:<br />
Performance-based compensation is not<br />
subject to the deduction limit of Section<br />
162(m). To qualify as performance-based,<br />
the compensation must be paid solely on<br />
account of the attainment of one or more<br />
preestablished, objective performance<br />
goals, and the following requirements must<br />
be satisfied:<br />
• Certain actions are taken by a board<br />
compensation committee consisting<br />
solely of two or more “outside directors”<br />
(as defined in Section 162(m)).<br />
• The performance goal:<br />
• is established in writing by the<br />
committee before 25% of the<br />
performance period has elapsed and<br />
in no event later than the 90th day<br />
of the performance period;<br />
• is substantially uncertain to<br />
be achieved at the time it is<br />
established;<br />
• is objective such that a third party<br />
having knowledge of the relevant<br />
facts could determine whether it is<br />
met; and<br />
• precludes discretion to increase<br />
the amount of compensation<br />
payable that would otherwise<br />
be due upon the attainment of<br />
the goal.<br />
• The material terms of the performance<br />
goal are disclosed to, and approved by,<br />
a majority vote of shareholders before<br />
the compensation is paid, including<br />
the performance goal criteria and the<br />
maximum amount of compensation<br />
a participant could receive during a<br />
stated period.<br />
Although a newly public company<br />
will initially benefit from the IPO<br />
transition relief, it will eventually need its<br />
compensation committee to be comprised<br />
of outside directors for purposes of<br />
this performance-based compensation<br />
exception and to conform its plans and<br />
practices to the extent necessary.<br />
(c) Section 16 of the Exchange Act<br />
Upon the IPO, company directors and<br />
officers (as defined in Section 16) and<br />
10% beneficial owners of company stock<br />
will become “Section 16 insiders” subject<br />
to the reporting and short-swing profit<br />
provisions of Section 16 of the Exchange<br />
Act. For more information about Section<br />
16 filings, see Section 7.3.<br />
(d) Executive compensation and other<br />
arrangements<br />
The company should also review its<br />
employment, severance and change-incontrol<br />
agreements, if any, and consider<br />
the pros and cons of adopting or amending<br />
those agreements in light of the company’s<br />
changed circumstances. When making<br />
its decision, the company should keep in<br />
mind the detailed compensation disclosure<br />
that will be required both in the IPO<br />
prospectus and, going forward, in its<br />
annual proxy statements and the intense<br />
scrutiny that disclosure will receive. In<br />
addition, the company should review any<br />
arrangements that may be considered<br />
direct or indirect loans or other extensions<br />
of credit by it or its subsidiaries to any of<br />
its executive officers or directors, as these<br />
must generally be terminated prior to<br />
effectiveness of the registration statement<br />
filed with the SEC to comply with SOX.<br />
(e) Say-on-pay voting<br />
SEC rules implemented under the Dodd-<br />
Frank Act require shareholder votes on<br />
executive compensation, or “say-on-pay.”<br />
The company is required to hold the<br />
following votes at the company’s first<br />
annual meeting following its IPO:<br />
• Say-On-Pay Vote—a nonbinding<br />
shareholder vote to approve the<br />
compensation of the company’s named<br />
executive officers as disclosed and<br />
described in the company’s most recent<br />
proxy statement. The vote must occur<br />
at least once every three calendar years.<br />
• Say-On-Pay Frequency Vote—a<br />
nonbinding shareholder vote to approve<br />
the frequency of the say-on-pay vote.<br />
The say-on-pay frequency vote must<br />
occur at least once every six calendar<br />
years.<br />
These two votes are both nonbinding<br />
votes that do not overrule the compensation<br />
decisions of the company’s board of<br />
directors, and they do not impose additional<br />
fiduciary duties on the board of directors or<br />
any committee.<br />
The SEC rules also require a company<br />
to provide disclosure about compensation<br />
arrangements with executives to be<br />
entered into in connection with an<br />
acquisition, merger, consolidation or sale<br />
or other disposition of all or substantially<br />
all assets of the company. These<br />
arrangements are commonly referred to<br />
as “golden parachutes.” Unless the golden<br />
parachute compensation arrangements<br />
were previously subjected to a say-onpay<br />
vote (whether or not approved by<br />
shareholders), a nonbinding shareholder<br />
advisory vote on the arrangements must<br />
also occur at the meeting at which the<br />
company’s shareholders are asked to<br />
approve the related transaction.<br />
(f) Clawback policies<br />
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires<br />
the SEC to publish rules (to be<br />
implemented by stock exchanges)<br />
prohibiting any company from<br />
listing a security if it fails to adopt<br />
a specified clawback policy. The<br />
clawback policy, which is triggered<br />
upon an accounting restatement due<br />
to material noncompliance with the<br />
financial reporting requirements of<br />
the federal securities laws, requires<br />
recovery of any incentive compensation<br />
from executive officers that was based<br />
upon the erroneous financial data.<br />
This financial recoupment is required<br />
from any current or former executive<br />
officer during the three-year period<br />
preceding the date on which the<br />
company is required to prepare the<br />
restatement, regardless of whether<br />
there was misconduct by the covered<br />
executive officers. (The Sarbanes-Oxley<br />
Act authorizes the SEC to seek similar<br />
recoupment from the CEO and CFO, but<br />
only if the restatement is the result of<br />
misconduct, albeit not necessarily by<br />
the CEO or CFO.) Under the formula,<br />
the clawback is calculated as the excess<br />
amount paid out to such executive<br />
officers over what would have been paid<br />
out based upon the restated results.<br />
The SEC has not yet published<br />
rules implementing this requirement,<br />
28 NYSE IPO Guide