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Preparing to go public<br />

This transition relief also applies to<br />

any compensation received pursuant<br />

to the exercise of a stock option or<br />

substantial vesting of restricted stock<br />

granted under such a plan or agreement, so<br />

long as the grant occurred on or before the<br />

earliest of the specified events.<br />

Performance-based compensation:<br />

Performance-based compensation is not<br />

subject to the deduction limit of Section<br />

162(m). To qualify as performance-based,<br />

the compensation must be paid solely on<br />

account of the attainment of one or more<br />

preestablished, objective performance<br />

goals, and the following requirements must<br />

be satisfied:<br />

• Certain actions are taken by a board<br />

compensation committee consisting<br />

solely of two or more “outside directors”<br />

(as defined in Section 162(m)).<br />

• The performance goal:<br />

• is established in writing by the<br />

committee before 25% of the<br />

performance period has elapsed and<br />

in no event later than the 90th day<br />

of the performance period;<br />

• is substantially uncertain to<br />

be achieved at the time it is<br />

established;<br />

• is objective such that a third party<br />

having knowledge of the relevant<br />

facts could determine whether it is<br />

met; and<br />

• precludes discretion to increase<br />

the amount of compensation<br />

payable that would otherwise<br />

be due upon the attainment of<br />

the goal.<br />

• The material terms of the performance<br />

goal are disclosed to, and approved by,<br />

a majority vote of shareholders before<br />

the compensation is paid, including<br />

the performance goal criteria and the<br />

maximum amount of compensation<br />

a participant could receive during a<br />

stated period.<br />

Although a newly public company<br />

will initially benefit from the IPO<br />

transition relief, it will eventually need its<br />

compensation committee to be comprised<br />

of outside directors for purposes of<br />

this performance-based compensation<br />

exception and to conform its plans and<br />

practices to the extent necessary.<br />

(c) Section 16 of the Exchange Act<br />

Upon the IPO, company directors and<br />

officers (as defined in Section 16) and<br />

10% beneficial owners of company stock<br />

will become “Section 16 insiders” subject<br />

to the reporting and short-swing profit<br />

provisions of Section 16 of the Exchange<br />

Act. For more information about Section<br />

16 filings, see Section 7.3.<br />

(d) Executive compensation and other<br />

arrangements<br />

The company should also review its<br />

employment, severance and change-incontrol<br />

agreements, if any, and consider<br />

the pros and cons of adopting or amending<br />

those agreements in light of the company’s<br />

changed circumstances. When making<br />

its decision, the company should keep in<br />

mind the detailed compensation disclosure<br />

that will be required both in the IPO<br />

prospectus and, going forward, in its<br />

annual proxy statements and the intense<br />

scrutiny that disclosure will receive. In<br />

addition, the company should review any<br />

arrangements that may be considered<br />

direct or indirect loans or other extensions<br />

of credit by it or its subsidiaries to any of<br />

its executive officers or directors, as these<br />

must generally be terminated prior to<br />

effectiveness of the registration statement<br />

filed with the SEC to comply with SOX.<br />

(e) Say-on-pay voting<br />

SEC rules implemented under the Dodd-<br />

Frank Act require shareholder votes on<br />

executive compensation, or “say-on-pay.”<br />

The company is required to hold the<br />

following votes at the company’s first<br />

annual meeting following its IPO:<br />

• Say-On-Pay Vote—a nonbinding<br />

shareholder vote to approve the<br />

compensation of the company’s named<br />

executive officers as disclosed and<br />

described in the company’s most recent<br />

proxy statement. The vote must occur<br />

at least once every three calendar years.<br />

• Say-On-Pay Frequency Vote—a<br />

nonbinding shareholder vote to approve<br />

the frequency of the say-on-pay vote.<br />

The say-on-pay frequency vote must<br />

occur at least once every six calendar<br />

years.<br />

These two votes are both nonbinding<br />

votes that do not overrule the compensation<br />

decisions of the company’s board of<br />

directors, and they do not impose additional<br />

fiduciary duties on the board of directors or<br />

any committee.<br />

The SEC rules also require a company<br />

to provide disclosure about compensation<br />

arrangements with executives to be<br />

entered into in connection with an<br />

acquisition, merger, consolidation or sale<br />

or other disposition of all or substantially<br />

all assets of the company. These<br />

arrangements are commonly referred to<br />

as “golden parachutes.” Unless the golden<br />

parachute compensation arrangements<br />

were previously subjected to a say-onpay<br />

vote (whether or not approved by<br />

shareholders), a nonbinding shareholder<br />

advisory vote on the arrangements must<br />

also occur at the meeting at which the<br />

company’s shareholders are asked to<br />

approve the related transaction.<br />

(f) Clawback policies<br />

The Dodd-Frank Act also requires<br />

the SEC to publish rules (to be<br />

implemented by stock exchanges)<br />

prohibiting any company from<br />

listing a security if it fails to adopt<br />

a specified clawback policy. The<br />

clawback policy, which is triggered<br />

upon an accounting restatement due<br />

to material noncompliance with the<br />

financial reporting requirements of<br />

the federal securities laws, requires<br />

recovery of any incentive compensation<br />

from executive officers that was based<br />

upon the erroneous financial data.<br />

This financial recoupment is required<br />

from any current or former executive<br />

officer during the three-year period<br />

preceding the date on which the<br />

company is required to prepare the<br />

restatement, regardless of whether<br />

there was misconduct by the covered<br />

executive officers. (The Sarbanes-Oxley<br />

Act authorizes the SEC to seek similar<br />

recoupment from the CEO and CFO, but<br />

only if the restatement is the result of<br />

misconduct, albeit not necessarily by<br />

the CEO or CFO.) Under the formula,<br />

the clawback is calculated as the excess<br />

amount paid out to such executive<br />

officers over what would have been paid<br />

out based upon the restated results.<br />

The SEC has not yet published<br />

rules implementing this requirement,<br />

28 NYSE IPO Guide

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