FAB Sri Lanka

24 c h i n a a n d c o n f l i c t-aff e c t e d s t a t e s: b e t w e e n p r i n c i p l e a n d p r a g m a t i s m
further compounded this: development projects were blocked by insecurity, human
and financial capital fled and basic infrastructure was destroyed.
Even though it saw some growth, Sri Lanka’s Central Bank estimates the country as
a whole lost two to three percent of gross domestic product (GDP) growth annually
due to the uncertainty caused by the war. 160 President Rajapaksa’s vision for national
economic development, Mahinda Chintana, places great emphasis on infrastructure.
This is reflected in the GoSL’s plan for the North (Uthuru Wasanthaya), which is based
on the belief that a return to growth in the North, spurred by large-scale infrastructure
projects, will ultimately bring reconciliation and peace. While most of its projects are
elsewhere in the country, China has supported this vision through contributing to
power generation and road construction in the North. As such, it could be argued that
through its assistance, China has supported both post-war reconstruction and peace
in the North and longer-term stability for the country as a whole. The President has
stated as much himself: “We appreciate very much the understanding shown by China
on the pressures of the post-conflict period, and the support extended to heal the
wounds of war”. 161
Nonetheless, several assumptions related to this approach need to be examined
critically. Firstly, debate exists over whether infrastructure-focused development
strategies are sufficient alone. Several Sri Lankan analysts and Western donors state
that Sri Lanka desperately needs updated infrastructure and that it “is a purposeful
and legitimate development goal for Sri Lanka and its people”. 162 However, some NGOs
argue that infrastructure must be accompanied by a parallel focus on ensuring that the
development it brings is equitable. 163 Others have criticised not the content, but the
delivery of Chinese infrastructure projects, pointing to the fact that it is often more
expensive than multilateral sources, it benefits Chinese firms, corruption is rife and
deals are not transparent enough. 164 At the same time, one donor official admits that
the Chinese are simply “following what the West used to do: we funded infrastructure,
we tied aid to our own commercial interests, and yes, there was corruption involved”. 165
Secondly, the extent to which economic development is a solution to Sri Lanka’s
instability is equally open to debate. Without denying its importance, relative underdevelopment
was only one conflict driver among many. As one Sri Lankan analyst
notes, “the conflict is driven by emotions of humiliation and anger that fuel the politics
of nationalism. This has not yet been addressed. Tamil nationalism explicitly seeks a
political solution – trying to tackle economic marginalisation cannot be seen as a
substitute to addressing this”. 166 This is in fact recognised by some Chinese analysts,
with one for example arguing that:
“We hope that the Tamils and other Sri Lankans can unite and that ethnic reconciliation
is found rather than continued calls for Tamil independence. In Sri Lanka, the political
institutions – democracy, elections, etc. – are there. But they do not have economic
equality, there exists inequalities between ethnic groups, and without economic equality
and development for all, there will be no peace. China can help the Government in the
economic field to meet these aims. But reconciliation – which is political – is the
responsibility of the Sri Lankan Government, and China cannot help there as it is internal
affairs.” 167
Even though they regularly highlight the importance of economic factors, Chinese
policy makers of course recognise that politics has a role to play too. However, there is
little open recognition of how engagement in the economic landscape affects political –
160 Op cit Linberg, p 32.
161 Cited in: op cit Xinhua (2011).
162 Saferworld interview, Colombo, June 2011.
163 Saferworld interview, Colombo, June 2011.
164 Saferworld interview, Colombo, June 2011.
165 Saferworld interview, Colombo, June 2011.
166 Saferworld interview, Colombo, June 2011.
167 Saferworld interview, Shanghai, May 2011.