Journal of the International Churchill Society - Winston Churchill

and unofficial histories, memoirs, diaries,
journals and biographies has served to blur
edges, fill in empty spots and generally add
color and balance to what had been, in all
probability, a wartime necessity.
I will admit to some surprise when I received
R.W. Thompson's Churchill and Morton.
I had seen mention of it as a secondary
source in Christopher Thome's Allies of a
Kind, and had rather expected a narrative or
memoir. What I found was interesting and
provocative — but disappointing. I had hoped
to find something instructive about the long
relationship between WSC and Desmond Morton.
There was some of that, but in a way only
incidental to the format of the book — a series
of letters between the author & Morton over a
period of 20 months relating the author's progress
in the writing of what would be The
Yankee Marlborough. Thompson professed to
be searching for the "real Churchill" to offset
the "mythical" or "legendary" man that he
believed most writers had foisted on the
reading public. I have not yet had the opportunity
to read Yankee Marlborough, so my
opinion may be premature and ill-informed,
but if the thrust of this book is an indication,
then Thompson is only partly successful. He is
attempting to complete a structure fitted
around a framework of preconceived opinions
and suppositions. I learned many years ago
that historical methodology is generally
limited by two extremes — one by the
historian who researches all relevant facts and
arranges them with no apparent attempt to interpret
them; the other by the historian who
constructs a framework for his thesis and uses
only those facts which agree and fit into that
framework.
Thompson's stated purpose was an assessment
of Churchill and his impact on our times;
to "discover the man." Yet he seems consciously
or otherwise to have attempted to
psychoanalyze him. WSC was neither a perfect
human being nor a "mere mortal," but I
do not consider Thompson or Morton qualified
to subject him to psychoanalysis. Nevertheless,
at one point Thompson arrives at the
conclusion that WSC's self-centeredness, his
need to dominate, was the result of having
been ignored by both his parents during his
formative years. There are other references by
Thompson and Morton to a dream that Churchill
had and had written about, concerning his
early soldiering career. They interpret the
dream to explain WSC's egotism, pride and
lack of consideration of others. At yet another
point, Morton shows that Churchill's character
made him incapable of complete friendship
with any other man . . . unless he could
consider that man inferior and of use to him.
And now, Thompson: "His aim was survival
at any cost. His values would not be consistent
with honour in the extreme." And again, Morton:
"Of course he was a great man, as the
world counts greatness. So were Henry VIII
and Ivan the Terrible.'' Morton also states that
Winston's nearest approach to a mutual friendship
in recent years was Brendan Bracken,
Bernard Baruch and possibly, Beaverbrook.
One would be led to believe that, in light of
some of those opinions of his character, Churchill
would have been fortunate indeed to have
had any friends at all.
There are a number of opinions relating to
WSC's wartime leadership, or lack of it.
Thompson states that 1941-42 was a vital
period when Churchill realized power, abused
it and virtually lost it in terms of the Allies. He
does not immediately expand on this theory,
but I consider that an astonishing remark to
make in view of the conditions leading up to
that time, over which he had no control. Great
Britain was still "paying the price" in terms of
production, manpower and shipping for having
not listened to WSC's warnings in the late
Thirties. Churchill may have misjudged the
military and political situation in the Far East
badly through that time, but he was not alone
in that respect.
Thompson and Morton criticize and question
Churchill's personal and military judgment.
Morton does absolve WSC of any blame
for the Dardanelles failure during WW I, but
he suggests that tactical and strategic errors in
WW II made by WSC helped greatly in contributing
to England's loss of power and position
in the world. The 1940 Norwegian campaign
is described as badly timed and ill-conceived.
Churchill is made responsible for the staggering
losses in the Far East, Middle East,
Balkans and various setbacks in the Mediterranean,
North Africa and, ultimately, the loss
of Eastern Europe. The implication is left that
WSC was a one-man band with a bad conductor.
Churchill is continually pictured as refusing
advice and forcing his decisions on all and sundry.
Morton disapprovingly accuses Churchill
of gathering information from sources other
than the Chiefs of Staff. In light of Morton's
function vis-a-vis WSC in the 1930s, it seems
a rather questionable point.
One of the most damning remarks in the
book is made by Morton in reference to the
relief of Gen. Wavell in North Africa: "The
first time I ever deeply disliked Winston and
realized the depths of his selfish brutality was
when he told me why he was sacking Wavell."
He quotes WSC as muttering over and over
again, "I wanted to show my power." Morton's
analysis was that Churchill heartily
disliked anyone whom he had to respect, but
couldn't dominate.
That he had the authority to sack Wavell is
unquestioned. That he made the correct decision
is probably arguable either way. That he
made it for the reason Morton states is totally
unacceptable. I'm sure that Morton believed
that was what WSC said. I simply do not.
Another of the more serious charges against
Churchill, in Morton's opinion, relates to the
aims and objects of Stalin. He tells Thompson
that "until the war was over and Churchill was
out of power, he never would grasp the truth
about Stalinism. Winston didn't realize that
Stalin was a reincarnation of all the worst
Czars. His entire concentration was on winning
the war and he gave no reasoned thought
to anything else whatsoever."
Subsequent developments might seem to support
that view, but I believe that he begs the
question. Churchill was aware, as early as
1918, of the depths of brutality of which
Lenin's Russia was capable. Stalin's rise to
21
power from that time certainly could not have
left any illusions. British Intelligence, through
various means, had been able to keep accurate
tabs on Russian military capabilities as early as
December 1942. The British also were aware
of the Russian psychological/political need for
buffer states on their borders. Churchill's
moves to assuage that need may have gone too
far, but in the last 18 months of the war there
was very little else that could have been done.
There was still the need to keep the coalition
together to defeat Germany. Even Morton
seems to concede that WSC hated the decisions
that were "more or less imposed on him
by Roosevelt at Yalta."
Thompson even appears to deny Churchill
his other accomplishments in writing and painting.
He told Morton that "none of this was
work in the true sense of the word — the work
that leads to scholarship." His pettiness also
includes Trumbull Higgins and Herbert Feis:
"Research and facts are sound, but they
should be, with university and foundation
backing, support and whole teams of research
workers."
My feeling is that the book fails in the attempt
to find the ''whole man.'' It is singularly
unbalanced against Churchill. It can best be
said by Gen. J.F.C. Fuller, "we are writing
lone impressions, much more of what we think
and feel." Or, by Morton: "Any sort of
history contains a greater or less element of
fiction . . . but rising above that the element of
'Art' can give a far truer impression of probable
historical fact than a catalogue of mere
facts." Witness some of Thompson's subsequent
books, apparently written using the
same approach and method: Churchill & the
Montgomery Myth, Montgomery the Field
Marshal, Churchill Revised, Generalissimo
Churchill. I realize that Thompson is one of
the better revisionist historians, and that there
are criticisms to be made of Churchill.
Relentless flattery is not appropriate or
desirable. But I much prefer Martin Gilbert's
catalogue of the facts.
— Tom Sherman
The Churchill Legend, by Francis Neilson;
Nelson, Appleton, Wis. 1954
Reviewing a review is a delicate task, but a
worthwhile one if the original work reviewed
is of particular interest or importance. Winston
Churchill's The Gathering Storm is unquestionably
such a work. It covers the years between
the close of the First World War and
Churchill's ascension to the Premiership in
1940, and is reviewed by Francis Neilson in
the appendix to his 1954 work, The Churchill
Legend.
Neilson is highly critical of The Gathering
Storm, just as his other writings are highly
critical of Churchill himself. The great
preponderance of his criticisms, however,
stem from a curious misunderstanding of the
nature of the work. The Gathering Storm is
avowedly a memoir, a personal perspective,
and makes no pretense of being a thorough and
impartial history of the period. "I do not
describe it as history," Churchill states, "for
that belongs to another generation. But I claim