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the x's being used in a cenain way. The other is a matter of the way the x in question is used and not a matter of correlations in which it stands with the y" (1967: +aQ . Clarke proposes to exclude inferences from narural evidence from the definition of signs (1987:49-50): "Clouds may signify rain [ . . . ], but they clearly do not refer to anything at all. To assign them a reference to the rain is to collapse the crucial distinction berween the significance and reference of a sign." According to his own proposal, a natural sign should "be defined as an event having significance for an interpreter which is not produced for the purpose of communicadon and whose interpretation does not require an inference from a linguistic generalizadon." This proposal is an attempt to mediate between two ancient rival theories of the sign, those of Stoic and Epicurean semiotics. The Epicureans defended a realist view of the natural sign. According to Sextus Empiricus (Against the Loglcians lI: 269-71), natural signs can be apprehended by direct observadon and do not require the mediation of language. Even animals can thus interpret natural signs. This view of natural semiosis has been accepted in the pansemiotic tradition from Augustine to Peirce and Morris. An early nominalist view of narural semiosis was the Stoic theory of signs. The nominalist Eco (1976: 17; I984b:31) sympathizes with this view because it makes natural semiosis depend on a criterion of "culrural recognition." According to the Stoics, the natural sign is not the association between a natural event A ("smoke") and a physically related event B ("fire"), but the result ofa process ofhypothetical reasoning. lnstead ofbeing events, A and B become propositions. The sign A is the antecedent of a hypothetical reasoning ("If there is smoke . . . ") and B is its inferred consequent (' . then there must be fire"). This rationalist view of natural semiosis is untenable within the larger framework of general semiotics. Its consequence would be the exclusion of zoosemiotics and large sectors of anthroposemiotics (for example, the semiotics of music') from the semiotic field. 2.3 The Dyadic Sign: A S;r'nopsis A clear-cut distinction between dyadic and triadic sign models is not always possible (see also 2. I . l). There is a zone of vagueness whenever a third correlate is mentioned but not systematically incorporated into the semiotic theory. Saussure's model is the prototlpe of a dyadic model. Although he mentions the "chose" in addidon to the signifier and the signified, he rejects it as a third correlate of the sign. Hjelmslev, while discussing reference in the domain of content-substance, also remains essendally dyadic in his concept of the sign. Furthermore, there are semioticians who postulate two aspects of the sign but consider the relation between sign vehicle and meaning to be the third component. Major dyadic definitions of the sign from the history of semiotics are summarized in the s1mopsis of Figure Si I. The definitions on which this suwey is based are as follows: I. Augusdne, see 1.3.2, 2.1.I, and History (2 r 5). 2. Alberrus Magnus and the Scholastics, see 2.1.r. 3. Hobbes, see2.2.2 and History Q.2.2). 4. Locke (1690) distinguishes two types of signs, (l) ideas as signs of things and (II) words as signs of ideas (see also Meaning 3.2): (I) "For, since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas" (Locke 1690: IV.2I.4). (II) "Words [ . . . ] stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind oJ him that uses them. [ . . . ] That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker" (Locke 1690: 111.2.2). See also History (3.3.3). 5. Port-Royal (: Arnauld & Nicole 1685), see Rey (1973: I l2), Auroux (I979:22), Swiggers (I981), and History (3.1.2). 6. Wolff (1720 S 293; cf. Coseriu 1967:98 and Trabant 1976a l7): "Thus, if two things occur always simultaneously or one always after the other, then one is always a sign of the 2. DYADIC MODELS OF THE SIGN . 87
orher. Such are called natural signs." See also History (3.1.1). 7. Degrirando (1800: I, 63), cf. History (3.3.4). 8.-9. See Saussure and Hjelmslev. 10. Cassirer (1922-38 175; cf. Krois 1984b: 440): "Under the term symbolic form should be understood each energy of human spirir through which an intelligible content and meaning is joined with and internally adapted to a concrete sensible sign." On Cassirer's theory of the sign and symbol, see History Q.6.2) and Typology (L.2.2). Il. Brihler (1933b; 1934), cf..2.1.2. 12. Bloomfield (I933), cf. Meaning (4.1) on behaviorism in semiotics. I3. Buyssens (1943 lZ,34-4I), c[ System (4 2) 14. Jakobson (I959a: 260; L96l: 575; 1975: 10ff.; cf. Waugh L976:38-53). 15. Goodman (1968: xi, 5) does not differentiare between sign and sign vehicle. His term rymbol "covers letters, words, rexts, pictures, diagrams, maps, models, and more." His referential view of the "s)'mbol" is apparent in this quote: "The plain fact is that a picture, to represent an object [footnote: I use 'object' indifferently for anything a picrure represents, whether an apple or a battle], must be a symbol for it, sund for it, refer to it." See also Image (3.4). Goodman's r epr esen tation, descrip ti o n, exem' plifcation, and expression (1968: 256) are not Sig. Correlates o srsnPehicle I the Dyad @ meaning (I) Augustine (397) srgn sign (as thing) (other) thing(s), something else (2) Albenus Magnus and Scholastics (l3th cent.) srgnum aliquid (vox) aliquo (res) (3) Hobbes (r6a0) srgn antecedent experience consequent experience (a) Locke (1690) (5) Port-Royal (Arnauld & Nicole 1685) srCn (1) sign (2) sign idea word idea of the representing thing thing idea idea of the thing represented (6) woH (1720) srgn one thing another thing (7) Degerando (1800) slgn sensatron idea (8) Saussure sign (signe) signifier (signifiant) signified (sigrifie) (9) Hjelmslev srglr exPressron content (10) Cassirer (I923tr.) symbol(ic) form concrete sensible sign content, meaning (lr) Biihler (I933b) slgn rePresentative (concrete thing) meanrng (I2) Bloomfield (1933) linguistic form speech sound, signal response in hearer (13) Buyssens (1943) seme semrc act meaning, signification (14) Jakobson (1959tr.) sign(um) signans signatum (r5) Goodman (1968) symbol [words, pictures, models, etc.l denotatum, object Fig. 5i I. Synopsis of dyadic models of the sign. (See also the synopsis M 3 on meaning, and History o[ Semiotics.) 88 I SIGN
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