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gangs in central and western Kingston and the expansion of security rackets in the downtown area made that region of the city more secure for shoppers even as entry into particular poor communities remained restricted. Department of State cables from the United States Embassy in Kingston indicated that high-ranking city officials in Kingston actively worked with gang leaders to provide security in commercial areas of the city. 41 Criminal organizations became more heavily involved in contracting, providing services to both government and private enterprises. At the same time ongoing political conflict, especially in eastern Kingston, continued to create intense divisions and restrict movement. Conflict between smaller criminal organizations associated with efforts to gain money through the myriad of micro-level extortion schemes operated throughout the city, and other smallscale criminal activity contributed to ongoing violence and exploding homicide rates that politicians had little ability to manage. On the positive side, the increasing depoliticization of the police and of violence in general led to more peaceful elections. Unfortunately, however, the ongoing dependence of politicians on local area leaders, many of whom also control gangs, for turning out votes and securing polling places in many parts of the city has prevented deeper reforms. Unlike Kingston, there is less evidence of strong politicalterritorial gang ties in Montego Bay. With only 100,000 inhabitants, Montego Bay has only a fraction of the population of the Kingston Metropolitan Area and, perhaps more importantly, the city only really began to grow in the 1980s, well after the establishment of the principal political gangs in Kingston. Montego Bay, as a result, does not have the same history of party aligned garrison communities. In recent years however, a number of territorial gangs have emerged to dominate the proliferating shantytowns in Montego Bay. Of particular importance here is the Stone Crushers gang that plays important roles in international drug trafficking. This organization has consolidated a degree of power in the St. James Parish since 2000 as its leaders have violently pursued other gangs and gained control of a sizable portion of the local extortion market. Pre-existing gang conflicts had driven many gang members abroad in the 1990s, creating a solid international distribution network for members of this gang. 43 (2008). Organized Crime and Politics in <strong>Jamaica</strong>: Breaking the Nexus. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press; p. 64-65. 43. “Crushed Stone,” <strong>Jamaica</strong> Gleaner, September 5, 2010, available at: http://jamaica-gleaner. com/gleaner/20100905/news/news1.html. 227 Organized Crime beyond Kingston Organized crime has a different history in the less densely populated western half of <strong>Jamaica</strong>. Large-scale criminal operations emerged historically out of much looser configurations with independent operators undertaking drug trafficking activities that dominated many elements of the underground economy in the region. Specific individuals might grow drugs, set up clandestine airfields, load drugs on airplanes, and transport them to the United States. The result was the emergence in western <strong>Jamaica</strong> of a less structured more entrepreneurial set of criminal enterprises in which legitimate business people, often from the middle and upper classes, engaged in international drug trafficking. 42 41. “US Embassy Cables: The Dangers in Extraditing Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke from <strong>Jamaica</strong>,” The Guardian, December 22, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cablesdocuments/223424. 42. Frater, Adrian (2010). “Crime Doesn’t Pay Montego Bay Pushes Back,” <strong>Jamaica</strong> Gleaner, April 14, 2010, available at: http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20100414/news/news1.html; Frater, Adrian (2010). “Montego Bay: Breeding Ground for Crime,” <strong>Jamaica</strong> Gleaner, April 8, 2010, available at: http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20100408/lead/lead3.html; Harriott, Anthony Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries NYU CIC
228 III. The Impact of Organized Crime on Governance <strong>Jamaica</strong>’s political and economic elite has been deeply implicated in nurturing the emergence of organized crime and violence in <strong>Jamaica</strong> over the past forty years. National responses to organized crime and violence have primarily been taken when political conflict and corruption have put the country in a bad light on the international stage, as was the case involving Dudus Coke in Tivoli Garden, or when gang leaders and politicians are aligned in bringing rates of violence down, as was the case with the restructuring of security arrangements in downtown Kingston from the late 1990s onwards. However, even then efforts remain superficial at best. Much needed constitutional reforms have yet to take place. The latter could reshape the way politics is waged and organized crime is supported, ensuring tighter oversight and transparency mechanisms. For example, in light of a move among Commonwealth nations in the Caribbean to shift away from the British parliamentary system, which concentrated power within the Office of the Prime Minister and provided limited checks and balances, in 1991 a Committee was established to provide recommendations for constitutional reform in <strong>Jamaica</strong>. The Stone Committee Report recommended the adoption of a presidential model with effective checks and balances on executive power. The report’s recommendations were however rejected in favor of a limit on the number of legislative members who could be appointed to the prime minister’s Cabinet and limited reforms have since been implemented. 44 Despite significant external investment in supporting key political and governance reforms through traditional development assistance or other sources of foreign aid, <strong>Jamaica</strong>n institutions remain weak and, apart from the military, most institutions have been unable to foster trust among the population: the police are viewed “with great distrust and [often] perceived as instigators of violence.” 45 Equally weak is the <strong>Jamaica</strong>n justice system: courts are 44. Barrows-Giles, Cynthia (2010).“Regional Trends in Constitutional Developments in the Commonwealth Caribbean,” Paper Prepared for the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, January 2010. Available at: http://webarchive.ssrc.org/pdfs/Cynthia_Barrow-Giles_Constitutional_ Development_in_the_Commonwealth_Caribbean_CPPF_Briefing%20Paper%20_f_.pdf. 45. Abuelafia and Sedlacek (2010). backlogged, while poor infrastructure and outdated practices add to existing challenges. Laws are enforced inconsistently, and there is a sense that individuals are not treated equally by the justice system. 46 <strong>Jamaica</strong>’s eight prisons and four juvenile facilities are overcrowded, with little segregation for high needs groups. 47 These conditions have created a lack of trust in the justice system, increased incidents of “mob justice,” and fostered a turn to community justice mechanisms to resolve crime. 48 The government adopted a hard-line security response in the wake of the Tivoli incursion. Supported by members of the international community, the response has led to a “concomitant disruption to criminal networks, and a negotiated end to violence with leading criminal groups.” 49 Combined, these efforts, many of which included the arbitrary use of force, have contributed to a decline in crime over the past year. 50 They also inadvertently bolstered the legitimacy of the former Bruce Golding Administration, despite the fact that Golding himself was clearly implicated in attempting to disrupt the course of justice and providing protection to Dudus. 51 In this case like many others, were it not for direct international pressure, Bruce Golding would not have moved against Coke despite his hard work to build a national profile as a reformer. Golding had sought to avoid extradition because of personal and party connections to the historic Shower Posse leadership, the importance of the Kingston Western Constituency to the JLP and to Golding himself, and because of the disruption that such an effort would entail for security in <strong>Jamaica</strong> over both the short and long term. Coke had worked collaboratively with <strong>Jamaica</strong>n officials and other criminal groups to establish an intricate security arrangement for downtown Kingston. 46. Government of <strong>Jamaica</strong> (2007). <strong>Jamaica</strong>n Justice System Reform Task Force Final Report. Available at: http://www.cba.org/jamaicanjustice/pdf/jjsrtf_report_final.pdf. 47. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank (2007). Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean. Report No. 37820. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Cr_and_Vio_Car_E.pdf. 48. Ibid 49. Arias (2010). 50. Rights groups and individual civilians complained that the government had used excessive force during and after the Tivoli incursion. These groups and individuals were joined by the public defender in initiating calls for inquiries into the operations of the security forces during and after the Tivoli incursion. Powell, Lawrence and Lewis, Balford (2009). The Political Culture of Democracy in <strong>Jamaica</strong>, 2008: The Impact of Governance. University of the West Indies/Americas Barometer/LAPOP/Vanderbilt University. Available at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2008/ jamaica-en.pdf. 51. Having initially denied it in parliamentary session, Golding himself admitted that he had covertly retained a U.S. law firm in Washington, D.C. to help negotiate a political settlement to the Dudus affair, namely to avoid extradition. Golding has since stepped down as Prime Minister. NYU CIC Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries
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Jamaica - Center on International Cooperation

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