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Governing adaptation to natural hazards in land-use planning

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Conclusions<br />

‣ In countries where damages for <strong>natural</strong> disasters are compensated<br />

<strong>in</strong>dependent of the private evaluation of risk, it is a national responsibility <strong>to</strong><br />

assure that damages do not exceed what can be expected on the basis of<br />

prior knowledge<br />

‣ The social costs of a national guarantee may very well be lower than the<br />

exceed<strong>in</strong>g costs related <strong>to</strong> moral hazard, which follows from such a guarantee<br />

‣ Unawareness of the moral hazard issue, national efforts <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease security,<br />

such as improvement of warn<strong>in</strong>g systems, may <strong>in</strong>crease losses of <strong>natural</strong><br />

<strong>hazards</strong><br />

‣ The government may reduce the cost related <strong>to</strong> moral hazard by ex-post<br />

evaluations of local efforts<br />

‣ It is still a problem that developments with negative expected values <strong>in</strong> a<br />

national context may be considered valuable <strong>to</strong> a municipality

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