Learning from the past ~ lessons for today - Holocaust Education ...

The Évian Conference
With thousands of Jews fleeing Nazi antisemitism, it was
clear that an international refugee crisis had developed.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of
America, convened an international conference at Évianles-Bains
in France in July 1938 to consider refugee
policies. Out of all of the 32 countries represented at the
conference, which included the United States, Britain,
France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Latin America,
Ireland and others, none was willing to take in more
Jewish refugees.
The Évian Conference, called to resolve the situation for
Jewish refugees, was deemed a failure. Myron Taylor, a
retired executive from the US who chaired the meeting,
asserted to the delegates that existing American
immigration quotas were liberal. Lord Winterton, a
member of the British cabinet, said that England was not a
country of immigration and that British colonies and
territories weren’t either. Canada said: no Jew is too many. A
German newspaper said: Jews for Sale – Who Wants Them?
No One.
Time magazine said shortly afterward: the hard fact
remains that no nation is willing to receive more penniless
Jews.
Ireland and Refugees
As Hitler’s power and influence increased in the 1930s,
thousands of German Jews and others opposed to him and to
Nazism attempted to flee Germany. The main targets of
persecution and discrimination were the Jews. They were
gradually excluded from public life, and eventually forced into
ghettos and rounded up for deportation. Few could have
guessed what lay at the end of those deportation transports.
Ireland was aware of the antisemitism of the Nazi state
and the fact that German Jews were being outlawed in
their own country. Although no formal policy regarding
refugees from Germany was worked out until 1938, the
Irish government and civil service effectively determined
to allow entry to as few Jews as possible.
There were two basic reasons cited for Ireland’s reluctance
to see a large number of refugees – and specifically Jews –
enter the country. First, the rate of unemployment in
Ireland was such that an influx of people in need of work
might damage the economy further. Consequently, the
government thought refugees might damage the economy
further and the government feared refugees would end up
a burden on the State. Secondly, many in government held
the view that the arrival of large groups of Jews would
result in a rise in antisemitism. This second factor was
never stated openly as a reason for the Irish government’s
ungenerous response to the refugee crisis.
We do not know how many Jewish refugees applied to come to Ireland, although it is
definitely in the hundreds, if not thousands. Only a small percentage of applicants was
actually admitted. While it is important to examine Ireland’s reaction to the refugee crisis in
the light of the broader historical context, and the policy examples provided by other countries,
especially Britain, one cannot ignore a persistent theme about this episode in Irish history:
immigrants were not welcome, refugees were not welcome, but Jewish immigrants and
Jewish refugees were less welcome than others.
Katrina Goldstone, Ireland and the International Reaction to Jewish Refugees, Dublin 2000
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