R. v. Cuerrier - British Columbia Review Board

R. v. Cuerrier
settled: fraud does not vitiate consent to assault unless the mistake goes to the nature of the act or the
identity of the partner. Fraud as to collateral aspects of a consensual encounter, like the possibility of
contracting serious venereal disease, does not vitiate consent. In amending the Criminal Code in 1983
and adopting a new definition of fraud for assault, including sexual assault, Parliament did not intend to
remove the common law limitations. An intent to broaden the crime of assault radically cannot be
inferred from Parliament's removal of the words "nature and quality of the act". Rather, Parliament
must be supposed to have expected that the courts would continue to read the Code provisions on sexual
assault against the background of the common law, unless it used language clearly indicating that it was
altering the common law. There is nothing in s. 265 to indicate such an intention. This conclusion is
supported by s. 45(2) of the Interpretation Act, which provides that an amending enactment shall not be
deemed to involve a declaration of a change in the existing law. It is also supported by the rule of
construction that where, as here, a criminal statute is ambiguous, the interpretation that favours the
accused is preferred. As well, the jurisprudence, without exception, supports the view that Parliament
intended to retain the common law definition of fraud for assault. Section 265(3) must, therefore,
continue to be read in light of the common law.
It is an established rule that courts will effect changes to the common law only where those changes
are incremental developments of existing principle and where the consequences of the change are
contained and predictable. Here, the broad changes proposed to the common law concept of fraud for
assault do not fall within this test. Both the application of the commercial concept of fraud, limited by
an ad hoc qualifier that there must be a "significant risk of serious bodily harm", and the application of
an unqualified view of fraud which includes any deceit inducing consent to contact amount to
abandoning the common law rule and substituting new principles in its place. Not only are the proposed
extensions of the law sweeping, they are unprecedented. Moreover, the theoretical difficulties with both
proposals are matched by the practical problems they would introduce. Parliament is better equipped
than the courts to foresee the complex ramifications of such sweeping change and make the necessary
value choices.
It is open, however, for courts to make incremental changes by extending the common law concepts
of nature of the act and identity, provided the ramifications of the changes are not overly complex. It is
the proper role of the courts to update the common law from time to time to bring it into harmony with
the changing needs of society. This applies to the common law concept of fraud in relation to assault. In
this case, the current state of the law does not reflect the values of Canadian society. It is unrealistic to
think that consent given to sex on the basis that one's partner is HIV-free stands unaffected by blatant
deception on that matter. Where a person represents that he or she is disease-free, and consent is given
on that basis, deception on that matter goes to the very nature of the sexual act. To say that such a person
commits fraud vitiating consent, thereby rendering the contact an assault, seems right and logical. A
return to the pre-Clarence view of the common law that deception as to venereal disease may vitiate
consent would catch the conduct here at issue, without permitting people to be convicted of assault for
other inducements, and would draw a clear line between criminal and non-criminal conduct. This
proposed extension of the law is relatively narrow, catching only deceit as to venereal disease where it is
established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was a high risk of infection and that the defendant
knew or ought to have known that the fraud actually induced consent to unprotected sex. This limited
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