Civil Society and the State in South Korea, by Michael Richardson

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SAIS U.S.-KOREA YEARBOOK CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN SOUTH KOREA Right Movement set forth comprehensive recommendations for the next administration’s North Korea policy. Members of the New Right Policy Committee, Citizens United for Better Society, Lawyers for Citizens, Liberty Union, and Hansun Foundation for Freedom and Prosperity jointly condemned the Sunshine Policy of Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. They criticized the policy for, among other things, failing to produce North Korean political reform, failing to open the North Korean economy, and failing to address North Korea’s human rights situation. The main causes of the policy’s failure, they argued, were its overoptimism and overreliance on one-way economic assistance. In the Sunshine Policy’s stead, the New Right groups proposed the strengthening of international cooperation based on an alliance among South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Rather than provide one-way assistance, Seoul would participate in an international consortium to develop the North’s economy. It would actively encourage internal reform, assist in organizing domestic and international reform-focused groups, and, significantly, require as a prerequisite the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. As the conservative sectors of South Korean society were well aware, the October summit’s outcome (as well as the fact that it was held at all) reflected the general policy preferences of South Korea’s progressive politicians and CSOs. Yet there is little available evidence that demonstrates the precise ways in which CSOs failed or succeeded in influencing the summit’s agenda. Did President Roh Moo-hyun raise (or not raise, as the case may be) certain agenda items because of civil society pressure, or because of unrelated personal or political reasons Does the joint statement reflect South Korean demands and North Korean concessions, or vice versa These questions may never be completely answered. It does seem clear, however, that once the parties from North and South Korea met in Pyongyang, there was little time for CSOs to exert any real influence over the outcome of the summit. According to one summit participant on the South Korean side who was interviewed for this paper, substantive interaction with North Korean officials proved difficult. Meetings of delegate subcommittees (held separately from the main talks between President Roh Moo-hyun and Chairman Kim Jong Il) were limited to one hour, and North Korean officials had no freedom to deviate from the North Korean Workers’ Party line. Moreover, while South Korea sent a delegation of independent civil society representatives and academics to the October summit, North Korea sent counterparts who had been organized and effectively “corporatized” by Kim Jong Il’s regime in Pyongyang. Even if academics and CSO representatives were limited in their ability to sway events at the October summit, many observers nevertheless view the overall role played by civil society in reunification efforts as critically important. The South Korean intellectual Paik Nak-chung has long argued that Korean reunification will differ dramatically from any historical precedents. “Briefly put, not only is a Vietnamese-style reunification through military conquest out of the question in Korea,” he writes, “but even a peaceful reunification, unlike that of Germany or of Yemen, can only proceed gradually, stage by stage.” In Paik’s view, civil society will have a major say in both the timing and the nature of a gradual North-South reunification, essentially functioning as a “third party” beside the governments in Seoul and Pyongyang. “Eventually,” he says, “it will not be possible to prevent the sphere of civic participation extending to the entire peninsula.” Paik is not alone in arguing for the importance of civil society’s third party buffer role in the Korean political system. Officials at the Ministry of Unification in Seoul noted during a recent briefing that CSOs are not bound to follow government policies; thus, they can help reduce the tensions caused by politics. For example, CSOs such as the Alliance for North Korean Human Rights can consistently provide humanitarian aid to North Korea even when diplomatic relations may be strained. Indeed, Ministry of Unification officials said that humanitarian aid sent by NGOs is often more readily accepted by the North than aid sent through official government channels. CSOs are therefore uniquely positioned to actively engage with the North Korean people and have the independence to pursue creative cooperation projects. Initiatives such as visits by South Korean pop singers to Pyongyang and the development of a Korean National Language Publishing Dictionary have been undertaken at the behest of civil society groups in Seoul. IX. CONCLUSION Korean civil society was active in 2007. This paper has detailed only some of the major developments and, for reasons of space, has left others unmentioned. Overall, major political issues such as North Korean denuclearization and reunification policy continue to seep into the realm of South Korean civil society. The polarization of civil society between left and right, progressive and conservative—artificial though those distinctions may at times be—has alienated many of the ordinary citizens whom CSOs aim to represent. Politicization can be poisonous. But at the same time, politicization can open doors through which CSOs can bring pressure to bear on political elites who might otherwise be less responsive to grassroots demands. To the extent 174 175
SAIS U.S.-KOREA YEARBOOK DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER LEE MYUNG-BAK that civil society can serve as a third party buffer, it also has the potential to substantially affect the course of Korean politics by working outside traditional political power channels. As Lee Myung-bak embarks on his five-year term as president of South Korea, conservative CSOs will likely find more receptive ears for their policies among political elites. But this does not guarantee that the interests of civil society and the government will necessarily coincide. If the experience of progressive CSOs under the Roh Moo-hyun administration is any indication, Grand National Party officials and New Right NGOs may clash as often as they cooperate. Meanwhile, the South Korean left, stranded in the cold after December’s elections, might take solace in knowing that its civil society representatives can continue to work for progressive causes even as the political winds change. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER LEE MYUNG-BAK Shaw-Lin Chaw I. INTRODUCTION It is a democracy: not as old or as deeply rooted as Japan’s, nor as politically fractious as Taiwan’s. Nevertheless, after the successful election of four presidents in a minimalist democratic climate of largely free and fair elections, and a fifth president in December 2007, South Korea is certainly a democracy with some measure of vibrancy. Cited by the New York Times in 1995 as a viable “East Asian model of prosperity and democracy,” based on fairness, equality, and the rule of law, the country survived the economic hard landing of the 1997 Asian financial crisis to emerge even stronger and more invigorated. South Korea is currently the world’s 13th largest economy, and it climbed up 12 spots last year to secure the rank of 11th best country for global business in a poll by the World Economic Forum. From the evolution of civil societies to a strong and independent news media, South Korea now has all the institutional underpinnings of a democracy. It has also experienced genuine power transitions: leadership changed hands peacefully in 1998 from the conservative government of Kim Young-sam to the first liberal dissident president, Kim Dae-jung, and to Roh Moo-hyun five years later. Power will return to the conservatives after those two liberal administrations. Lee Myung-bak will assume office on February 25, 2008. Despite numerous setbacks and limited successes over the years, South Korea’s democratization story—especially during the Sixth Republic, from 1987 to the present— has been an astounding one. With a focus on the recent presidential election, this paper examines how the leaders of this medium-sized state 176 177
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Civil Society and the State in South Korea, by Michael Richardson

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