Liberty's Second Reading Briefing on the Counter-Terrorism & Security Bill in the House of Commons

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must be facilitated within a “reasonable time” following an application. 26 The term “reasonable time” is left open to interpretation: there is no time limit. 16. If an individual subject to a TEO is granted a permit, on returning to the UK the Secretary of State may place the individual, by notice, under obligations to report to a police station, attend appointments and give address details (“section 8 obligations”). It is an offence to attempt to re-enter the country in breach of a TEO (i.e. without a permit) or to breach any section 8 obligation. 27 17. When giving evidence to the JCHR immediately before the publication of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, the Reviewer of Counter-Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, described the Government’s much touted exclusion orders as “an announcement waiting for a policy”. 28 At different times, the Government has argued both that the TEO scheme would provide a “discretionary power to allow us to exclude British nationals from the UK” 29 and that it would simply “control the return of a UK citizen”. 30 Neither statement paints the full picture and the confused policy which has emerged in this Bill offers the worst of both worlds. The orders do not simply control the manner of return. Return will be prevented for those who may be practically unable to apply for a permit. Those without sufficient money or means, those being controlled by another or resident in a failed or failing State. A permit may be refused to a person who fails to attend an interview, whether by accident or design. An individual unwilling or unable to attend an interview or return in the manner prescribed by the Home Secretary may not return to the UK. Even in those cases where an individual complies with the requirement to attend an interview, he will still be trapped in a foreign jurisdiction at the Home Secretary’s pleasure. Conversely, the Bill does not ultimately prevent return by those willing to comply. For those who genuinely seek to do us harm, the system of TEOs, permits and section 8 reporting obligations will offer few obstacles. Unsafe 18. If the ultimate objective of the Government is to exclude citizens it believes to be dangerous by reintroducing a form of medieval exile, the policy will not assist. A determined 26 Sub-clause 5(3). 27 Sub-clause 9(1). 28 David Anderson QC, Uncorrected transcript of evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights: “Counter-terrorism and Human Rights”, Wednesday 26 th November 2014, HC 836. 29 The Prime Minister, Hansard 1 Sep2014: Column 26. 30 Home Secretary, Speech on Counter-Terrorism, 24th November.
terrorist seeking to plot murder and mayhem is unlikely to be phased by the prospect of an interview prior to return to the UK. Provided he attends, the Home Secretary is obliged to issue a travel document. A stipulation that he return on a certain flight to a certain airport, will ensure that the Agencies and police know of an individual’s location should they wish to surveil him, but the same outcome is achieved through placing a simple notification requirement on carriers. If the Government genuinely seeks a ‘managed return’, a targeted, intelligence-led system of notification would avoid the obvious principled and practical problems, discussed in more detail below, of a policy of extra-territorial, executive passport invalidation. The individual could then be interviewed on their arrival in the UK under existing counter-terrorism powers allowing any further necessary action – by way of surveillance or criminal proceedings – to be taken as appropriate. Ultimately the only action which will neutralise the threat is intelligence gathering, including by close surveillance of suspects, in pursuit of arrests and prosecutions. The TEO scheme frustrates these objectives by notifying a dangerous person that he is of interest to the authorities, potentially driving his activities further underground. 19. The TEO scheme further involves a period of temporary, enforced residence in a foreign jurisdiction. This could be any country in the world and in the short to medium term the power could feasibly be used against British citizens present in countries such as Turkey, Iraq, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Algeria, Mali, Nigeria. It is difficult to see how a proposal which temporarily traps an individual in a region where jihadi groups have a strong presence will further the core objective identified to the ISC by SIS of breaking the link between UK extremists and terror groups in foreign countries. 31 Those who are equivocal are more likely to be pushed towards terrorist factions by the imposition of executive led punishments and enforced periods in close proximity to such groups. Liberty is also concerned by evidence that MI6 views the fact that a suspect is outside the jurisdiction as a solution to the immediate threat, absolving it of responsibility for ongoing investigation. The ISC raised this concern in their recent report, stating “The Committee therefore finds SIS’s apparent lack of interest in Adebolajo’s arrest [in Kenya] deeply unsatisfactory: on this occasion, SIS’s role in countering ‘jihadi tourism’ does not appear to have extended to any practical action being taken.” (Recommendation H). 32 31 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, ‘Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby’, para 61. 32 ISC Report, page 26, recommendation G.
Page 1 and 2: Liberty’s second reading briefing
Page 3 and 4: Introduction 1. This is the seventh
Page 5 and 6: 5. The power can be used multiple t
Page 7 and 8: individual and ask consensual quest
Page 9: 13. Using the power of arrest also
Page 13 and 14: Interviewing of Detainees Overseas
Page 15 and 16: and prosecutions carried out where
Page 17 and 18: certificate and possessing offensiv
Page 19 and 20: suspects.” 50 In their view TPIMs
Page 21 and 22: 41. It is unclear from the broad dr
Page 23 and 24: 47. For the same reasons that Liber
Page 25 and 26: duplicitous State intervention. In
Page 27 and 28: 57. This would mean that the State
Page 29 and 30: 63. To the extent that these proble
Page 31 and 32: scale of its interception programme
Page 33 and 34: that his claim can proceed. Mr Just

Liberty's Second Reading Briefing on the Counter-Terrorism & Security Bill in the House of Commons

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