3. Wrongful interference with goods, trespass to land, nuisance

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4 aeroplane passing through the air above the land. Accordingly, I reach the conclusion that a trespass and not a mere nuisance was created by the invasion of the plaintiff's airspace by this sign. (2) Konskier v B Goodman Ltd [1928] 1 KB 421 (Court of Appeal) Facts: A firm of builders and contractors, engaged in pulling down the upper storeys of a house in a certain street, obtained from the then owner and occupier of the adjoining house, No. 87, a licence to pull down part of the chimney stack of No. 87, in consideration of which they undertook to rebuild it and to make good any damage caused to No. 87 in doing any of the works. In June, 1926, they finished the work of pulling down and rebuilding, but they omitted to remove a quantity of rubbish which they had allowed to fall on the roof of No. 87. In course of time this rubbish, being carried down by a drain pipe from the roof, choked a gully in the basement of No. 87. In July, 1926, the plaintiff became the tenant of No. 87. In September, 1926, a heavy storm of rain flooded the basement of that house owing to the gully being stopped. Scrutton LJ Mr. Hilbery (for the defendant) contended that the case must be treated as one of negligence or nothing; and that there was no continuing negligence, because at the time of the acts or omissions complained of there was no duty owed by the defendants to the plaintiff who did not become tenant until afterwards; that the duty owed by the defendants was owed to the person who was tenant of the house in June, 1926, and there can be no continuing negligence without a continuing duty. That contention seems to be sound, but it does not dispose of another cause of action, a cause of action arising upon the undisputed facts of the case. If it was a trespass to leave the rubbish on the roof, it was a continuing trespass at the time when the plaintiff became tenant of the property. Mr. Hilbery says there was no trespass, because at the time when the rubbish fell upon the roof the defendants had a right to put it there provided that the falling of rubbish upon No. 87 was a reasonable incident of the work they were doing. But they had no more than a limited licence and were bound to remove the rubbish when their work was finished; and if they did not remove it within a reasonable time after the work was done, they could not and cannot now contend that the rubbish was lawfully there. By failing to remove it they rendered themselves substantially trespassers and the trespass was a continuing trespass. But a new occupier entering upon premises on which there is a continuing trespass has a cause of action in trespass in respect of it. (c) Nuisance (1) R v Shorrock [1994] 98 Cr App R 67 (Court of Appeal) Facts: The appellant was charged with causing a public nuisance after an "acid party" which had generated 275 complaints to the police. The party was held in a field owned by the appellant in his absence. The appellant had been paid £ 2,000 for the hire of the field; but maintained that he had been unaware of the use to which it had been put. At his trial it was submitted that he had no case to answer because the Crown had failed to show that he knew or ought to have known that a public nuisance would result from his actions. The appellant was convicted and appealed against conviction on the grounds that the judge had erred in directing the jury that the correct test to be applied was whether the appellant "knew or ought to have known of the consequences of his act," and had wrongly rejected a submission of no case to answer. Lehrstuhl Zivilrecht VIII Prof. Dr. Ohly Introduction to English Law
5 Rattee J: Accordingly, in our judgment, the learned trial judge was correct in his direction that the appellant was guilty of the offence charged if either he knew or he ought to have known, in the sense that the means of knowledge were available to him, that there was a real risk that the consequences of the licence granted by him in respect of his field would be to create the sort of nuisance that in fact occurred, and that the judge was accordingly right to have rejected the appellant's submission to the contrary. A landowner was responsible for a nuisance which he knew or ought to have known would be the consequence of activities carried out by him on his land. In the case of a private nuisance, an aggrieved plaintiff could enforce the landowner's responsibility by an action in tort, while in the case of a public nuisance that responsibility could be enforced either by a relator action by the Attorney-General or by a criminal indictment. The judge had, accordingly, correctly directed the jury that the appellant would be guilty of the offence charged if he knew or ought to have known that there was a real risk that the consequences of the licence granted by him in respect of his field would be to create the sort of nuisance which in fact occurred. (2) Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316 (Chancery Division) (The facts are outlined in the judgment.) North J In my opinion the Plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction for which they ask. They have lived for three years in a semidetached house, and, from the description given to me of the way in which sounds are heard between the houses, I think the party-wall cannot be very substantial. The Plaintiffs' family consists of the husband, who, perhaps fortunately for himself, is very deaf; the wife, who is admitted to be a skilful musician and an excellent pianist; and a daughter, a young lady who has received a good musical education and has taken a very good musical degree. She teaches the pianoforte and violin, but she does not sing. The mother and the daughter have musical pupils, some at home and some abroad. I have no reason to conclude that there has been of late any increase in the number of the pupils or in the extent of the lessons. Miss Christie practises to some extent; Mrs. Christie does not; and the Plaintiffs occasionally have musical parties in the evening, and they also have music in the evening for their own enjoyment. The Defendant lives in the adjoining house. He has a wife and a small child. He and his family are said to be musical, and for some years past they have been in the habit of having a musical evening once a week. The music does not seem to have been of a very high class, but there is nothing to lead me to suppose that it was not good music of its class. On the 30th of September, moved by some cause or other, the Defendant wrote a letter to Mr. Christie. This letter was certainly written in a tone calculated to set up the backs of the Plaintiffs' family. The letter was received by Mr. Christie on the 1st of October. The next letter was written by the Plaintiffs' solicitor to the Defendant on the 12th of October. During the interval, according to the Plaintiffs' evidence, unusual noises had proceeded from the Defendant's house which interfered with the comfort of the Plaintiffs' family, and to some extent with the pupils' lessons, and also with Miss Kennedy's composition and practice. This went on to such an extent that Mr. Christie instructed his solicitors. The result is that I think I am bound to interfere for the protection of the Plaintiffs. In my opinion the noises which were made in the Defendant's house were not of a legitimate kind. They were what, to use the language of Lord Selborne in Gaunt v. Fynney, "ought to be regarded as excessive and unreasonable." I am satisfied that they were made deliberately and maliciously for the purpose of annoying the Plaintiffs. Lehrstuhl Zivilrecht VIII Prof. Dr. Ohly Introduction to English Law
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3. Wrongful interference with goods, trespass to land, nuisance

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